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This dissertation is devoted to studying how workers initially match with firms, and are sub-
sequently retained or reallocated over time. The first two chapters—one theoretical, the other
empirical—specifically ask how asymmetric employer information distorts career placement
and efficiency in a dynamic setting. The final chapter studies optimal dynamic compensa-
tion policy from the standpoint of a single employer attempting to maximize retention at
minimum cost.
In Chapter 1, I develop a new framework to investigate the efficiency costs of asym-
metric information in the labor market. I consider a setting where, similar to Greenwald
(1986), employers have an inside advantage in learning their employees’ abilities. I then
add complementarity between firms’ heterogeneous technologies and the abilities of their
workers in order to study how asymmetric information can disrupt the efficient assignment
of workers to firms. Workers’ abilities are initially hidden and become privately observed by
their employers. Incumbent firms retain high-ability workers. Low-ability workers separate
to uninformed but comparatively advantaged outsiders where the returns to ability are low.
Relative to a static optimum, new hires over-place into inefficiently high-type firms, and
then become under-placed as they accumulate tenure. These placement distortions present
an added source of inefficiency relative to a symmetric learning environment. I derive a vari-
ii
ety of testable implications of the model, and prove a non-parametric method for identifying
the surplus function.
In Chapter 2, I present evidence on how adverse selection and production complementar-
ities interact to produce distinct patterns in reallocation. I build a new data-set on the US
market for lawyers by linking together the Martindale-Hubbell professional directories from
1930-1963. I show evidence that lawyers who separate from surviving firms are adversely
selected, and move to firms where their peers have lower average ability. Meanwhile, lawyers
who separate after their firm exits move to firms with higher-ability peers, but are not posi-
tively selected compared to similar lawyers who are retained. These results provide evidence
to support the asymmetric learning model of Chapter 1.
In Chapter 3, which is co-authored with Moshe Buchinsky and John de Figueiredo,
we examine the cost-effectiveness of compensation policy in the federal government. We
estimate a dynamic retention model using the federal government’s personnel data, exploiting
exogenous pay variation caused by the 1990s civil service pay reform known as the Federal
Employees Pay Comparability Act (FEPCA). We find that the elasticity of retention to pay
is typically around 25% for the workers in our sample. The model can be combined with
assumptions about government hiring in order to make long-run out-of-sample forecasts of
payroll costs, turnover, and workforce composition under alternative compensation policies.
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CHAPTER 1
Adverse Selection and Complementarity in the Labor
Market
1.1 Introduction
Many labor markets feature firm-worker complementarity, in which it is efficient for some
firms to be matched to higher ability workers than others. However, when workers enter the
labor market, their ability is often highly uncertain. By monitoring their new hires at work,
employers are likely to resolve much more of this uncertainty than the rest of the market.
In such an environment, how efficient are the initial placements? And how much, if at all,
do the private observations of employers eventually benefit society through reallocation?
To answer this question, I develop a new modeling framework that combines firm-worker
complementarity and asymmetric employer learning. Each firm’s comparative advantage is to
hire a worker whose ability matches the distinct return to ability inherent to its technology. If
workers’ abilities were immediately known, then the model would feature immediate perfectly
assortative matching. Instead, each worker enters the labor market with a noisy signal,
resulting in an imperfect initial match. Her new employer privately learns her ability, and
competes against ill-informed outside firms to retain her. A classic lemons problem ensues
(Akerlof, 1970), where high-ability workers are retained and only low-ability workers are
relinquished to outsiders.
Returns to assortatively matching firm and worker types ensure that some endogenous
separations occurs in spite of the adverse selection problem.1 Outside offers come from
1In Greenwald (1986), endogenous separations also occurs in spite of the winner’s curse, and in spite of
firms being homogeneous. In his model, a constant rate of exogenous turnover, which is indistinguishable
1
lower-type firms whose technology gives them a comparative advantage in hiring low ability
workers.
Workers are publicly revealed to be above or below a threshold based on whether or
not they are retained, leading to increasingly precise Bayesian inference about their types.
Hence, the large initial inefficiencies of the lemons problem are rectified over time through
reallocation and information leakage. However, this reallocation is distorted relative to a
symmetric learning setting. Retained workers eventually become under-placed at the current
firm, and are inefficiently restrained by the adverse selection problem from moving up to a
higher-type firm. Because of the future prospect of under-placement, new matches feature
over-placement. The simple cutoff dynamics of beliefs is a major advantage of the model’s
equilibrium, ensuring that the analysis remains tractable as the time-horizon extends to
infinity—a rare feat for an asymmetric learning model.
In addition to predicting that endogeneously separating workers move to lower-type firms,
the model makes the stark prediction that workers who are displaced by exogenous firm exits
will mvoe to higher -type firms, due to the aforementioned under-placement phenomenon.
The model provides a tractable quantitative framework for evaluating allocational efficiency
and assessing potential labor market reforms.
Having summarized the main results of my paper, I will end the introduction with a
review of the related literature. The rest of the paper will be divided as follows. Section 1.2
presents the model, solves it and derives a set of testable implications as well as normative
predictions. Section 1.4 explains how to identify the model using employee-employer matched
data. Section 1.5 describes several model-based tests. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.1.1 Related Literature
Learning about ability. I build on the employer learning literature. The idea that asym-
metric information between employers distorts mobility and impedes the efficient assignment
from endogenous turnover, makes it attractive for below-average workers to quit and blend in rather than
remain at the incumbent and receive low wages. My model does not have this particular mechanism because
exogenous shocks leading to turnover can be correctly distinguished.
2
of workers to firms comes from a long literature dating back to Waldman (1984), Greenwald
(1986), and Gibbons and Katz (1991). The main goal of this literature has been to explain
empirical patterns in wages and promotions, and it has therefore emphasized heterogeneity
across tasks within firms. Some examples include Bernhardt (1995), Waldman (1984), and
Waldman (2016). My goal is to instead explain empirical patterns in interfirm mobility, so I
focus on heterogeneity across firms. Consequently, whereas the contribution of much of the
previous literature has been to explain the signaling content of job titles, the contribution
of my paper will be to explain the signaling content of one’s current employer. I formalize
the idea that some firms are more selective than others, and thus confer different degrees of
status when their names appear on resume´s.2,3
One of the main predictions from the literature on asymmetric learning in the labor
market has been that job assignments within firms will signal private information, and that
firms will tend to under-promote relative to a first-best setting in order to prevent the
resulting loss of their informational rents, with Waldman (1984) being the first to point
this out, and DeVaro and Waldman (2012) establishing empirical evidence that promotions
indeed carry signaling content. There has been comparatively little work on the extent to
which asymmetric learning distorts assignment to firms, rather than within firms.
There appears to be only one other paper that has theoretically investigated firm hetero-
geneity in the context of asymmetric learning: the working paper of Ferreira and Nikolowa
(2019). Both of our models resolve the apparent “why do firms chase lemons” (p. 2)
paradox—i.e., explain why firms poach from each other despite the winner’s curse created
by asymmetric learning. However, their model predicts that endogenously separating workers
move to higher type firms, while I predict the opposite.4
2Consistent with this idea, Bidwell et al. (2015) analyze survey data from investment bankers to show
that higher status firms attract more talented employees without paying them more due to better signaling
opportunities, which they dub the ”I used to work at Goldman Sachs” effect.
3I choose to abstract from task heterogeneity despite the distinction between partners and associates at
large firms. During the sample period of my data, only about 4% of lawyers in law firms were identified as
associates. Thus, it seems reasonable to abstract from possible strategic information transmission created
by different job titles when using data from this period. Future iterations of my model could certainly
incorporate this feature.
4There are some other important differences. My model admits a wider range of firm and worker
3
My model features dynamic updating of beliefs about each worker’s ability through an
evolving posterior, which relates directly to the literature on the speed of employer learning,
and presents an asymmetric information alternative to the standard symmetric learning
framework of Farber and Gibbons (1996). My model is one of the first of its kind to admit an
arbitrarily long time horizon without losing tractability, a contribution that was anticipated
by the authors.
An alternative benchmark would be “private learning,” where only the worker
and the current employer observe performance outcomes, but other market par-
ticipants draw appropriate inferences from the observed actions of the worker
and the current employer. Because the game-theoretic issues associated with
such strategic information transmission can be complex, most analyses of the
private-learning case have been in two period settings with special assumptions
about functional forms and probability distributions. (Farber and Gibbons, 1996,
p. 1008)
A rich literature following Farber and Gibbons (1996) has sought to test hypotheses about
the nature of employer learning. The most influential prediction of these models is that
over time, hard-to-observe measures of ability should become relatively more predictive of
wages, and easily observed measures such as education and race relatively less predictive.5
My model makes a similar but not identical prediction. According to my model, wages
should become less correlated with ex ant characteristics like education and race and more
correlated with true ability over time. However, the relationship between true ability and
wages should be entirely mediated through the worker’s public job history.
One of the most interesting contributions from this literature, starting with Altonji and
Pierret (1998), has been to use the estimated speed of employer learning to indirectly assess
potential justifications for schooling as a means of obtaining pre-job market signals. Most of
this research makes the implicit assumption that pre-job market signaling is socially wasteful
heterogeneity in order to make the model relevant to empirical work.
5This implication was actually first recognized by Altonji and Pierret (2001), who confirmed it using the
NLSY79 data.
4
by abstracting from how information influences the quality of firm-worker matches. The main
contribution of my model is to present a framework that economists can use to assess the
ex-ante social benefits of having more precise information about ability.
1.2 The Model
Endowments and technology. There are infinitely many firms indexed by type θ ∈ R+
that have the option of either participating in the ‘inside market’, or participating in an
‘outside market’ with known period profits C(θ), which are increasing in θ. The inside
market is initially endowed with a stock of workers with randomly distributed ability z which
is normalized to be uniformly distributed between two endpoints, z1,1 and z2,1.
6 Firm-worker
pairs produce output according to f(θ, z), which is increasing in z and θ.7
Structure of the game. The model is a repeated game played between workers and firms.
Time t = 1, 2, . . . is discrete and infinite. Each worker begins a period with an attachment
status θ denoting the type of her current employer, or incumbent firm, with θ = ∅ implying
that she is initially unattached. The incumbent privately observes the worker’s ability z,
while the entrepreneurs and the worker simply know the public history. All actions are
public.
Offer-making. Each worker will be put up for a bidding in which firms have the opportu-
nity to make competing spot wage offers to her. The attached workers are put up for bidding
first. Vacant firms can make the worker an outside offer, and then the incumbent can make
a counteroffer. After the incumbent makes the counteroffer, it observes a mean-0 i.i.d. shock
ε to the payoff of retaining the worker, and can choose to adjust its offer by the amount ε.
The worker then chooses any of the previously made offers, or quits to become unattached.
6Hence, a worker’s z measures their percentile in the ability distribution. The assumption of a one-
dimensional, time-invariant talent or “individual competency” (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002) parameter is
fairly standard in the literature.
7My preferred interpretation of the outside market is that it is a market that produces the same goods
and services but where workers’ abilities are known with certainty.
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Every offer and counteroffer bears an infinitesimally small writing cost. The bidding then
moves to unattached workers (including any who recently quit). This time, only the vacant
firms have the opportunity to make offers, and the worker chooses her preferred offer. If she
gets zero offers, the worker exits the industry.8
Period payoffs. At the end of a period, the workers payoff is the accepted wage. Each
winning firm loses the offered wage and gains output. Each firm type has a fixed opportunity
cost of operation, C(θ), so I will refer to its surplus as s(θ, z) = y(θ, z)−C(θ) and I assume
that a winning firm’s payoff is s(θ, z) (or s(θ, z) + ε, for incumbents) minus the accepted
wage. Losing firms obtain zero payoffs.
Death and transitions. If a winning firm and its worker both survive, then they enter
next period attached. Workers live to be at most T periods old, and along the way have a
chance of dying (exiting the sector permanently) at exogenous rate 1 − δ. A firm dies if it
makes an offer that goes unaccepted, or if its worker dies.9 Otherwise, firms can also die
exogenously at rate 1 − λ. If the firm had previously employed a worker, then she enters
next period unattached.
Definition of an equilibrium. An equilibrium is a collection of (1) beliefs mapping
the history of play into a probability distribution over each worker’s ability, and (2) strate-
gies mapping histories of play into wage-offers, counter-offers, adjusted counteroffers, quit
decisions, and offer-acceptances. I will search for a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE).
The Perfect Bayesian restriction requires that agents’ beliefs be consistent with Bayes’ rule,
wherever it applies, and that the decision rules be sequentially rational according to those
beliefs. I make the following additional refinements.
8The assumption that incumbents respond sequentially to poaching offers is the most common modeling
choice among recent asymmetric employer learning papers, but see Li (2013) for an important counter-
example. All-else equal, alternative timings are likely to change the amount of turnover predicted by the
model. My identification strategy in Section 1.4 will be robust to misspecification of this timing, but
counterfactual estimates will not be. I explain how to test the timing assumption in Section 1.5.
9This assumption is similar to Assumption 9 in (Bernhardt, 1995, p. 319), and is made to ensure that
the relevant history remains tractable. However, it is possible to show that in equilibrium firms would never
re-match with a worker from whom they had previously endogenously separated.
6
Equilibrium refinement. The shock ε is equal to zero. The equilibrium must be the
limit of a sequence of equilibria corresponding to a sequence of random variables, {ε}∞k=1,
in which each εk has continuous support covering the real line. For most of the analysis, it
will suffice to ignore ε. But this refinement helps ensure that off-path beliefs about quitting
workers are plausible. The refinement is similar in spirit to the Trembling Hand (Selten,
1975) and Sequential (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) refinements in the literature.
For this next assumption, note that a multivariate function f(v) is homogeneous of degree
(HD-) α if and only if f(tv) = tαf(v) for all t ≥ 0.
Assumption 1 (Homogeneity). The surplus function s(θ, z) is HD-φ in θ and z.
This assumption is made for computational tractability as the homogeneity properties will
carry through to other equilibrium functions. It is not necessary for most of the qualitative
results.
Assumption 2 (Concavity and one-to-one optimal matching). s(θ, z) is strictly concave in
θ and, fixing z, is maximized at s?(z) = s(θ?(z), z) > 0. θ?(z) is either strictly increasing or
decreasing in z.
This assumption implies that in a full-information setting, all workers are matched to a
unique firm type, and that the farther a worker departs from the optimal matching, the less
surplus she creates.
1.3 Solving the Model
1.3.1 Key Features of the Equilibrium.
In what follows, let t ∈ 1, 2, ..., T denote a worker’s age in the current period. Let θt denote
the worker’s attachment status at the start of the period. I will be particularly interested in
matches that are not ‘grossly’ misplaced in the following sense.
Definition 1. Consider a worker attached to θt with posterior ability between z1,t and z2,t.
A worker is misplaced if θt’s full-information match is below z1,t (or above z2,t).
7
The following claim, which I will prove later on, is the core feature of the equilibrium.
Claim 1 (Cutoff rule retention and quits). Fix (t, θt) and assume that the worker is not
misplaced. In equilibrium, θt makes a counter-offer if and only if it privately knows that z
is larger than some cutoff Z which depends on the public history, and which occurs with
probability strictly between 0 and 1. The amount of the counteroffer, if made, is constant.
The counteroffer is never adjusted, and the worker never quits. Off-path, if the worker quits,
she is believed to have ability equaling the cutoff Z.
This feature says nothing about misplacement. In fact, such matches can have multiple
equilibrium outcomes, but I will show that regardless of which outcome is played, such
matches will never arise endogenously and can therefore be safely ignored from the analysis of
the equilibrium path. The next two corollaries immediately follow, describing how posterior
beliefs update after observed counteroffers.
Corollary 1. Suppose Claim 1 holds and the worker is not misplaced. Then the posterior
distribution zt of a worker’s ability is z ∼ U(z1,t, z2,t), where the end-points evolve according
to the following recursive rule:
1. Begin the worker’s life at z1,1 = 0 and z2,1 = 1 .
2. After a counter-offer is made, raise z1 to equal the cutoff. If the worker subsequently
quits, lower z2 to equal the cutoff.
3. After a counteroffer is withheld, lower z2 to equal the cutoff
4. Otherwise, both cutoffs remain constant.
Claim 2 (Markov Perfect Equilibrium). Let (z1,t, z2,t) characterize a worker’s posterior abil-
ity. Suppose that she is attached to incumbent θt ∈ (z1,t, z2t). Her expected equilibrium
earnings at the beginning of the period can be described by some function υt(θt, z1,t, z2,t). If
she is unattached, her equilibrium earnings can be described by some function Vt(z1,t, z2,t)
and the vacant firm that she matches to as θt(z1,t, z2,t). The amount of the incumbent’s coun-
teroffer, if one is made, can be described by some function wR(z1,t, z2,t). The incumbent’s
8
payoff is, conditional on true ability z, described by some function Πt(θt, z1,t, z2,t, z). All
equilibrium strategies and beliefs are functions of (t, θt, z1,t, z2,t) which evolve in equilibrium
according to a first-order Markov process.
Henceforth, refer to υt(θt, z1,t, z2,t) as the attached value function, θt(z1,t, z2,t) as the
equilibrium assignment function, Vt(z1,t, z2,t) as the unattached value function, Zt(θt, z1,t, z2,t)
as the cutoff rule function, wRt (z1,t, z2,t) as the retention wage, and pit(θt, z1,t, z2,t, z) as the
ex-post incumbent profit function. Also, define the ex-ante incumbent profit function as
Πt(θt, z1,t, z2,t) ≡ Ez (pit(θt, z1,t, z2,t, z)|z1,t ≤ z ≤ z2,t) .
All of the above functions are defined to equal 0 if t > T . In equilibrium, if a vacant
firm successfully wins a worker, it must earn exactly zero expected profits from doing so.
Otherwise, a vacant firm of the exact same type would be willing to deviate by making a
strictly higher offer, which the worker would be willing to accept. The next lemma follows
by definition of Πt+1(θ
v, z1,t, z2,t).
Lemma 1 (New-hire wage). Suppose Claim 1 and Claim 2 hold. Suppose that a vacant
firm θv successfully hires an age-t worker in equilibrium who has posterior ability (z1,t, z2,t)
when she accepts the offer. Then it pays her a new-hire wage wH satisfying
wHt (θ
v, z1,t, z2,t) = Ez (s(θv, z)|z1,t ≤ z ≤ z2,t) + δλΠt+1(θv, z1,t, z2,t). (1.1)
The value of joining the vacant firm is the new-hire wage above, plus the continua-
tion value associated with becoming attached to it next period, or (if it exits) becoming
unattached. The winning vacant firm is the one that provides the highest overall value. More-
over, in the case where z is known with certainty (z1,t = z2,t), the worker’s full-information
match is willing to pay her full-information payoff s?(z1,t) in every remaining period of her
life. This gives a recursive result for the unattached value function.
Lemma 2 (Unattached value function). Suppose Claim 1 and Claim 2 hold, and the worker
9
is not misplaced. Then
Vt (z1,t, z2,t) = max
θv
V˜t(θ
v, z1,t, z2,t)
where Vt(θ
v, z1,t, z2,t) =w
H
t (θ
v, z1,t, z2,t) + δ (λυt+1 (θ
v, z1,t, z2,t) + (1− λ)Vt+1 (z1,t, z2,t)) .
(1.2)
Moreover, if z1,t = z2,t, then
Vt (z1,t, z2,t) = St (z1,t) ≡
T∑
t=1
δts(θ?(z), z).
Lemma 3 (Retention wage). Suppose Claim 1 and Claim 2 hold and consider an attached
worker whose incumbent uses cutoff rule Z. Then if the worker is retained, her continuation
value is St(Z). The incumbent pays a retention wage of
wRt (θt, z1,t, z2,t) = St(Z) + δ (λυt+1(θt, Z, z2,t) + (1− λ)Vt+1(Z, z2,t)) ,
where Z = Zt(θt, z1,t, z2,t).
(1.3)
See proof on page 74.
Lemma 4 (Cutoff rule). Suppose Claim 1 holds. Fix (t, θt, z1,t, z2,t) at the start of the period
and assume that θt is the full information match for some z ∈ supp (z|z1,t < z ≤ z2,t). Then
the cutoff Z = Zt(θt, z1,t, z2,t) solves
s(θt, Z) = w
R
t (θt, z1,t, z2,t). (1.4)
Proof. Claim 1 says that as long as t < T and the incumbent is above the full-information
match for z1,t, then the worker always has a chance of being retained at a cutoff that remains
below the incumbent’s full-information match (until the final period). Consequently, a worker
who is marginally retained at age t is guaranteed not to be retained in at age t+1. Thus, the
incumbent’s benefit of retaining the marginal type Z = Zt(θt, z1,t, z2,t) worker is the surplus
s(θt, Z) and nothing more. The cost is the retention wage. Hence, the marginally retained
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worker type is paid her wage.
Lemma 5 (Attached value function). Suppose Claim 1 and Claim 2 hold and fix (θt, z1,t, z2,t).
Let Z = Zt(θt, z1,t, z2,t). If the worker is retained—i.e., receives a counteroffer—(with prob-
ability pR), her continuation value is St(Z). If the worker is not retained, she receives
continuation value V (z1,t, Z). Hence,
υt (θt, z1,t, z2,t) =
(
1− pR)V (z1,1, Z) + pRSt(Z),
where pR =
1− Z
z2,t − F (z1,t) ,
and Z = Zt(θ1, z1,1, z2,1).
(1.5)
Proof. Vacant firms who make the initial offers correctly anticipate that they only win when
the incumbent firm doesn’t make a counteroffer, in which case the worker’s posterior is
(z1,t, Z). Thus, the vacant firms bid on the worker as if she was unattached of type (z1,t, Z).
Hence, if she doesn’t get a counteroffer (with probability 1− pR), the worker’s continuation
value is Vt(z1,t, Z).
With probability pR, the worker is retained at cutoff Z, and from Lemma 3, we know
that she receives St(Z).
Lemma 6 (Profit). Suppose Claim 1 and Claim 2 hold. Then the ex-post profit function is
pit(θt, z1,t, z2,t, z) =
0 if z ≤ Zs(θ1, z)− wR + λδpit+1(θt, Z, z2,t, z) if z > Z,
where wR = wRt (θt, z1,t, z2,t)
and Z = Zt(θt, z1,t, z2,t).
(1.6)
Proof. The current ex-post profit is the surplus s(θt, z) minus the retention wage. Then, with
probability δλ, the worker and firm both survive, and the incumbent receives the ex-post
incumbent profit associated with next period.
The ex-post profit function follows immediately from integrating the ex-post profit func-
tion with respect to the posterior distribution of ability.
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Corollary 2. The ex-ante profit function is give
Πt(θt, z1,t, z2,t) = p
R
(
Ez (s(θ1, z)|z1,t < z ≤ z2,t)− wR + λδΠt+1(θt, Z, z2,t)
)
,
where wR = wRt (θt, z1,t, z2,t),
pR =
1− Z
z2,t − F (z1,t) ,
and Z = Zt(θt, z1,t, z2,t).
(1.7)
Proposition 1. Claim 1 and Claim 2 hold.
See proof on page 75.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium functions have the following properties.
1. The cutoff rule is HD-φ in (θt, z1,t, z2,t) and increasing in t
2. The retention probability is HD-0 in (θt, z1,t, z2,t) and decreasing in t
3. The unattached value function is HD-φ in (θt, z1,t, z2,t), convex in (z1,t, z2,t), and de-
creasing in t
4. The equilibrium assignment function is HD-1 in (θt, z1,t, z2,t) and decreasing in t
5. The attached value function is HD-φ in (θt, z1,t, z2,t) and increasing in t
6. The ex-ante incumbent profit function is HD-φ in (θt, z1,t, z2,t)
See proof on page 76.
Recall that θt(z1,t, z2,t) is the firm type that maximizes V˜t(θ
v, z1,t, z2,t), which I defined in
Lemma 2. By analyzing the function V˜t(θ
v, z1,t, z2,t), I can derive some comparative statics
relating posteriors to equilibrium matching.
Proposition 3 (Assortative matching on posterior ability). θt(z1,t, z2,t) is
1. HD-1;
2. ≤ θ?(z2,1), with equality if and only if z1,t = z2,t;
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3. ≥ θ?(z1,1), with equality if and only if z1,t = z2,t;
4. Increasing in z1,t and z2,t.
5. Decreasing in t
Finally, an analytically useful feature of the equilibrium is that the functions become
stationary as the remaining time-horizon extends to infinity.
Proposition 4 (Infinite-horizon Markov equilibrium). The equilibrium functions converge
uniformly to stationary functions.
Proof. As T goes to infinity, the equilibrium functions converge uniformly to stationary func-
tions. I proved that each equilibrium function is monotonic in time. It is also trivial to show
that each function belongs to a compact set. Thus, by the monotone convergence theorem,
each equilibrium function converges pointwise. Dini’s theorem (Rudin, 1976, p. 150) then
says that pointwise convergence of a monotonic sequence of continuous functions along a
compact set implies uniform convergence. Thus, each equilibrium function converges uni-
formly. Since there are a finite number of equilibrium functions, the collection also converges
uniformly.
1.3.2 How to Solve for the Equilibrium
I will now explain how one can computationally solve the model, which is at a minimum
necessary to produce counterfactuals and which could be also be used to estimate the model
via indirect inference. To solve the model analytically, one would apply backward recursion
to the equilibrium objects using the formulas in Section 1.2.
Setting T to be some arbitrary number, we will move back in worker’s age t. Given
knowledge of the age t + 1 objects, we can recover the age t objects using the following
recursive procedure (the order matters, as some of the time t objects rely on other time t
objects):
1. Calculate the unattached value function using Lemma 2.
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2. Calculate the retention wage using Lemma 3.
3. Calculate the equilibrium cutoff rule using Lemma 4.
4. Calculate the ex-ante incumbent profit function using Corollary 2 (calculating the ex-
post incumbent profit function is unnecessary).
5. Calculate the attached value function using Lemma 5.
Computational methods. Because these functions lose analytical tractability after a few
iterations, it is essential to use numerical methods to solve the model for doing quantitative
exercises like simulation or structural estimation. To that end, I will enumerate several
dimension reduction techniques that can be used when solving the model.
First, every equilibrium function features homogeneity. Thus, it is only necessary to
solving for the equilibrium functions in the cases where z2 = 1. Then, one can always recover
those functions cases where z2 6= 1 by applying the corresponding degree of homogeneity in
Proposition 2. For example, V (t, z1, z2) = z
φ
2V (t,
z1
z2
, 1).
Second, workers are never ‘misplaced’ in equilibrium, which means that one only needs
to solve for the equilibrium functions in the domain where θt ∈ [z1,t, z2,t].
Third, given that a worker is not misplaced, there is always an interior solution to the
cutoff equation in Equation 1.4. Given that an interior solution exists, it clearly does not
depend on z1,t—only on θt and z2,t. Combining this with the earlier points, one needs to
solve for the cutoff rules when z1,t = 0 and z2,t = 1.
1.3.3 Model Predictions
The model makes several interesting and empirically testable predictions about worker-firm
dynamics.
Initial over-placement, eventual under-placement. An unattached worker in the
final period T places with the firm that maximized static expected surplus. The final result
of Proposition 3 says that young workers with small t place higher than older workers where
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t = T . The final period T is a static constrained optimum benchmark where an unattached
worker simply matches with the firm that maximizes expected surplus. Thus, young workers
over-place relative to what is dictated by static efficiency. On the other hand, workers who
enter period T attached are always under-placed. Since θt is the full-information match
for the marginally retained type, it must be strictly below the optimal match for the full
distribution of retained types. The optimal strategy for maximizing expected output, and
therefore earnings, is to compensate for the tendency of retention to lead to under-placement
by over-placing initially. As the number of remaining periods increases, so does the risk of
eventual under-placement, causing equilibrium assignment to decrease in t.
These phenomena are added sources of inefficiency relative to a standard symmetric
learning setting, where matches should maximize expected surplus based on the available
information, as imperfect as it may be.10
Cutoff rules are ex-ante inefficient. Imagine if vacant firms could commit in advance to
their sequences of cutoff rules and wages. Could they present an unattached worker with a
better offer than what she receives in equilibrium? Again, the answer is yes. The equilibrium
unattached value function is equal to the worker’s net present expected surplus, so to answer
this question we merely need to consider whether a marginal adjustment to a cutoff rule at
some point during an employment spell results in strictly higher expected surplus.
Consider changing the cutoff rule Z in state (t, θt, z1,t, z2,t) while leaving the rest of the
equilibrium unchanged. Define Nt(z) to denote the worker’s total expected surplus along
the equilibrium path if she is unattached in period t and has true ability z. Define Rt(z)
to denote the worker’s total expected surplus along the equilibrium path if, instead, she is
retained at the incumbent in period t. The worker’s expected surplus at the start of the
period is
10It is also possible to rationalize over-placement or under-placement by adding mobility costs and as-
suming a particular surplus function that results in the same asymmetric mobility predicted by this model.
It is also possible to rationalize similar distortions if learning is endogenous to firm type, but in this latter
case we should see no distortions in the final period t = T .
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S˜t(Z) =
1
z2,t − z1,t
∫ z
z1,t
Nt(z)dz +
1
z2,t − z1,t
∫ z2,t
Z
Rt(z)dz,
The derivative and second derivative of S˜t(Z) are
S˜ ′t(Z) =
1
z2,t − z1,t (Nt(Z)−Rt(Z)) ,
S˜ ′′t (Z) =
1
z2,t − z1,t (N
′
t(Z)−R′t(Z)) .
Conditional on the worker’s true ability, z, the sequence of firms she is matched to in
each future period is deterministic. Moreover, by the envelope theorem, we can treat this
sequence as fixed when calculating the effects of marginal changes to the time t cutoff rule
on future surplus. By Proposition 3, the type Z worker will be matched with strictly worse
firms at all future points in time if separates at time t than if she is retained at time t. Since
higher-type firms have higher returns to ability, N ′t(Z)−R′t(Z) is therefore negative, and we
can conclude that S˜t(Z) is strictly concave. We can also verify that S˜
′
t(z1,t) > 0 as long as
θt > θ
?(z1,t), in which case the separating worker would be matched to her full-information
match and produce strictly more surplus than if she has to be retained at the incumbent for
a period.
Hence, if the optimal cutoff is below z2,t, then it must satisfy the first-order condition
Nt(Z) = Rt(Z). I.e., the marginal worker must generate equal net-present surplus streams
if she is retained or if she separates. Compare this to the equilibrium cutoff condition:
s(θt, Z) = St(Z)− δ ((1− λ)Vt+1(Z, z2,t) + λSt+1(Z ′)) ,
where Z ′ is the future period’s cutoff. In the case where t = T , the marginally retained
worker is the incumbent’s full-information match, which immediately implies that Nt(Z) <
Rt(Z). Hence, committing to a higher T cutoff rule could increase expected surplus, ceteris
paribus. On the other hand, as the number of remaining periods goes to infinity and δ goes
to 1, the cutoff equation can imply an arbitrarily small s(θt, Z), causing the cutoff rule to be
16
too low. The cutoff that maximizes the bilateral surplus between the worker and the firm is
generally not the same as
Separation and net present income. All-else equal, the model predicts that a re-
tained worker’s net-present income is strictly higher than that of a separating worker. Let
V R(θt, z1,t, z2,t) and V
N(θt, z1,t, z2,t) denote these respective payoffs.
St(θt, Z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Retained NPV earnings
>
1
1− δE(s
?(z)|z1,t < z ≤ Z) > Vt(θt, z1,t, Z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Separated NPV earnings
whereZ = Zt(θt, z1,t, z2,t).
(1.8)
This will form the basis of an empirical test that I discuss in the identification section.
Reallocation and Signaling Content of Endogenous versus Exogenous Separa-
tions. The most interesting testable implication of the model pertains to the reallocation
and signaling content following separations. If a separation is endogenous—i.e., the worker’s
ability was below the incumbent’s cutoff—then the worker’s ability should be lower than the
ability of an otherwise similar retained worker. Moreover, according to Proposition 3, she
should move to a lower type firm.
On the other hand, if the separation is exogenous—i.e., unrelated to the worker’s ability—
then the worker’s ability should still be less, at least on average, then that of an otherwise
similar retained worker. However, the model predicts that, if the number of remaining
periods are sufficiently high, the worker will move to a higher-type firm. The reasoning
is simple: as T − t → ∞, assignment becomes an increasing and approximately Markov
function of the posterior (z1, z2). Workers who are displaced during a lengthy employment
spell have a strictly better posterior than when they started, so they move to a better firm.
The literature on asymmetric employer learning commonly predicts that displaced work-
ers should suffer less adverse wage changes than laid off workers because the latter carry less
stigma. However, the prediction that displaced workers move to better firms appears to be
a unique consequence of the interaction between complementarity and asymmetric learning.
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Turnover, age, tenure, and firm type. The model predicts that turnover is a function
of age t, the uncertainty in ability measured by z2,t
z1,t
, and incumbent firm type relative to
ability measured by θ
z1,t
. Ceteris paribus, turnover is increasing in firm type, increasing in
age, and decreasing in ability uncertainty. The unconditional relationship between tenure
and turnover is driven by these variables. I.e., workers with identical posteriors, firm types,
and age are predicted to have the same amount of tenure.11
Wage dynamics. The wages of retained workers are always equal to the surplus of the
marginally retained ability type. The marginally retained ability type increases with tenure,
and thus so do wages.
Conditional on a retained worker’s posterior ability, higher type firms pay lower wages,
because the marginally retained worker is always below the full-information match, which
guarantees by Assumption 2 that the marginally retained worker’s surplus is decreasing in
firm type. However, because higher-type firms have higher turnover rates, retained workers
at higher type firms experience faster wage growth.
The wages of new hires, given in Equation 1.1, behave quite differently. A new hire’s
wage equals her expected first period of output, plus any additional expected rents during
the subsequent employment spell. As a result, it is possible for new hire wages to be strictly
larger than subsequent retention wages. Although this may initially seem counterintuitive,
it is perfectly consistent with the observation that employers often pay large signing bonuses
to their recruits. As the uncertainty in a worker’s posterior declines (z1,t/z2,t approaches 1),
the difference between the average and marginal output in a firm should decline, and these
signing bonuses should become less important.
Earnings dispersion. As is typically the case with symmetric learning models, the
model predicts rising earnings dispersion with age. Each state branches into three possible
successor states (separation, displacement, retention), necessarily increasing ex-post earnings
inequality compared to the predecessor state.
11The equilibrium will produce matches in which workers with different posteriors match to the same
firm. For example, in the infinite horizon case, a worker who is repeatedly retained by her first firm will
have strictly higher cutoffs than a worker of the same age who has just joined the firm.
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1.4 Identification
I will now describe how to identify the theoretical model under several scenarios with different
degrees of observables and auxiliary assumptions. Suppose we observe firms indexed by
f = 1, ..., F and workers indexed by i = 1, ..., N . In what follows, I will write f(i, t) to
denote the firm of individual i in period t, θf to denote the type of firm f , (zi,1,t, zi,2,t) to
denote the posterior ability of worker i in period t, and Zi,f,t to denote the cutoff that firm
f uses on worker i in period t.
Assumption 3 (Empirical shocks). A worker’s empirical assignment is equal to the equi-
librium assignment function plus an error u1i,t such that
ln θf(i,t) = ln θt(zi,1,t, zi,2,t) + u
1
i,t.
u1i,t is i.i.d. and independent of true ability zi. Similarly,
lnwi,f,t = lnw
R
t (θt, zi,1,t, zi,2,t) + ui,t,2.
ui,t,2 is i.i.d. and independent of true ability zi.
This relaxes the model to allow for idiosyncratic deviations from predicted equilibrium
assignment patterns, which are then assumed to resume following equilibrium play.
The worker and firm exit rates are straightforwardly identified.12 The model has two
remaining unknowns: the period-surplus function s(θ, z), and the distribution over pre-
market posterior ability. This section will present multiple complementary identification
strategies, which all rely on (1) inferring firm-types, θi,t, and (2) inferring workers’ posterior
abilities throughout time, (zi,1,t, zi,2,t.
Assume that we observe panel data on an infinite number of workers workers i = 1, ...,∞
observed in periods t = 1, ..., T of their labor market history. For each worker-period ob-
12Random exit is the only source of time-discounting. Adding pure time preference or secular productivity
growth could be easily accommodated.
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servation, we can observe the mutually exclusive ‘mobility outcomes’ where the worker is
retained (Ri,t), separated (Si,t), or displaced by a firm exit (Di,t) at the end of the period.
1.4.1 Identifying Posteriors upon Entry
The prior over z is the standard uniform distribution. However, workers may have public
information that is revealed about them upon entry, but before they begin matching with
firms.
Assume that the econometrician observes all of the initial public information about work-
ers when they first enter the market unattached. Then I will show that it is possible to
identify the mapping between this information, and the pre-market posteriors, based on the
relationship between net present income and initial information.
Assume that every piece of information is binary.13 This could include knowledge of
GPA thresholds or certifications, for example. Each individual piece of information need not
directly imply a cutoff with-respect-to z—for example, graduating from Harvard could be
a positive signal for women and a negative signal for men. My strategy will hinge on first
identifying the mean ability attributable to each distinct set of information. Let X = {xk}Kk=1
enumerate the set of positive-probability realizations of pre-market information.
My strategy requires first being able to observe average ability, or some other percentile
of the ability distribution, for each realization of x.
Proposition 5. Suppose that, for each xk, the econometrician either observes the qth
quantile, qk, of ability, or observes the probability ρk ∈ (0, 1) of ability exceeding some
fixed percentile in the unconditional ability distribution. Then the pre-market posteriors
{z1(xk), z2(xk)}Kk=1 are non-parametrically identified.
See proof on page 77.
13The assumption that workers enter the market with a (potentially non-standard) uniform ability means
that this is without loss of generality
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1.4.2 Identifying Post-Entry Posteriors and Cutoffs
Given the posterior upon entry identified above, we can identify the entire sequence of
cutoff rules used and posterior ability during a worker’s career using mobility outcomes and
observable retention probabilities.
A worker’s current posterior (zi,1,t, zi,2,t) is a function of her previous posterior, last pe-
riod’s mobility outcome (separation, retention, or neither if the worker was dispalced or
began unattached), and last period’s retention probability. The current retention probabil-
ity ri,t is a function of the incumbent firm and the worker’s current posterior. Therefore, we
can identify each worker’s posterior dynamically using the following procedure.
First, set t = 1 and let the initial posteriors identified above correspond to (zi,1,t, zi,2,t). We
will seek to build a sequence of posteriors and cutoffs, with the latter defined by convention
to equal the lower-bound of the posterior in periods where the worker is initially unattached.
For each i with an incumbent firm, identify
ri,t = Pr(separate|separated or retainedf(i, t), zi,1,t, zi,2,t).
By the uniform assumption, the cutoff rule is Zi,t = (zi,2,t − ri,t(zi,2,t − zi,1,t)). If i has no
incumbent firm, Zi,t = 0. Then, iterate the posterior forward using
(zi,1,t+1, zi,2,t+1) =

(zi,1,t, zi,2,t) if i neither separate nor retained at t
(zi,1,t, Zi,t) if i separates at t
(Zi,t, zi,2,t) if i is retained at t.
If we continue iterating for all t, we will have fully identified the sequence of posteriors for
each worker.
1.4.3 Identifying Firm Types
There are two strategies for identifying firm types, which all require some sort of scalar
normalization, so I assume that the lowest firm type equals 1.
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Ranking Firms by Performance. Suppose that the econometrician observes a firm’s
accounting profit pif,t defined as total output minus payroll costs. Assume that the measured
profit equals the equilibrium profit plus a mean-0 i.i.d. error, and that firms are observed
for infinitely many periods. Then a firm’s expected equilibrium output and profit are both
proportional to θφf . Hence, firm types satisfy the following regression equation:
ln pif,t = α0 + φ ln θf + u
3
i,t, ui,t ∼ i.i.d.,Eui,t = 0.
Assume without loss of generality that firms are ranked in ascending order of expected profit.
Then α0 = E (ln pik,t|f = 0) and θk = E (ln pif,t|f = k)− E (ln pif,t|f = 0) .
One advantage of this approach is that it will allow us to directly test Proposition 3 by
estimating the equilibrium assignment function in a model-free way and comparing it to the
model’s predictions.
Ranking Firms by Recruitment. Workers’ posterior abilities are identified. Firm types
can therefore be identified based on the posteriors of the workers that they hire. From
Proposition 2, we know that firm assignment is homogeneous of degree 1. Hence,
θt(z1,t, z2,t) = z1,tθt(1,
zi,1,t
zi,2,t
)
which implies
ln θf(i,t) = ln zi,1,t + ln θt(1,
zi,1,t
zi,2,t
) + u1i,t.
Taking expectations over the workers hired into f implies
ln θf = E
(
ln zi,1,t + ln θt(1,
zi,1,t
zi,2,t
)|i hired into f at t
)
.
Fixing the ratio zi,1,t/zi,2,t, each firm’s type can be identified up to a constant of propor-
tionality by varying the observed zi,1,t of new hires. Combined with the assumption that
θ0 = 1, firm types are identified.
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1.4.4 Identifying the Surplus Function
Consider the wage equation lnwi,t = ln s(θi,t, Zi,t) + ui,t,2. Dividing by θi,t and using homo-
geneity yields
lnwi,t = φ ln θi,t + ln s(1,
Zi,t
θi,t
) + ui,t,2.
We now effectively observe Zi,t and θi,t. Let W (θ, ζ) = E(lnwi,t|θi,t = θ, Zi,tθi,t = ζ).
Thus, we can identify φ as
∂W
∂θ
,
and then we can identify the function
ln s(1, ζi,t) = W − φ ln θi,t
over the support of ζi,t = Zi,t/θi,t. Thus, the surplus function is non-parametrically identified
for all observed values of ζi,t.
1.5 Testing
This section derives a series of empirical tests of the model that can be implemented using
the same kinds of data as discussed in Section 1.4.
Direction of mobility. The model’s most distinctive predictions are that separating
workers move to lower-ranked firms, while displaced workers mobility is less downward, and
potentially upward (as discussed, a sufficient condition is if T large). This can be immediately
tested by computing the average changes in firm type by type of separation.
Over-placement. The model predicts that new workers over-place—that is, place higher
than the static expected surplus-maximizing match θ¯i,t = arg maxθ E (s(θ, z)|zi,1,t < z ≤ zi,2,t),
but that the degree of over-placement is decreasing in age and the ratio zi,1,t/zi,2,t.
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The surplus function and workers’ posteriors are identified, so {θ?(zi,1,t, zi,2,t)}i,t is iden-
tified. Thus, the over-placement prediction can be immediately tested by comparing θ¯i,t to
θi,t across worker-year observations.
Exogenous exit. The model assumes that exits of firms and workers are exogenous to their
types. There are several forms of endogenous exit, and failing to model them will generally
result in incorrect model predictions, and in some cases require adjusting the identification
strategy.
Under the null hypothesis that the model is correctly specified, testing exogenous firm
exit is equivalent to testing the statistical independence of firm exit from identified firm
type. Testing exogenous worker exit is more complicated. First, we can test the statistical
independence of the identified posterior ability from worker exit. However, even if exit is
independent of posterior ability, it could nonetheless be dependent with true ability. Thus,
another test of the model that speaks directly to this issue is to test whether the unconditional
distribution of talent, according to the distribution of the posteriors, remains uniform across
each value of age t.
Turnover profiles. The model predicts that turnover rates are an increasing function of
three arguments: t, θi,t/zi,1,t, and zi,2,t/zi,1,t. All three arguments are identified, and retention
is observable, so the predicted relationships are directly testable.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper developed a new theory of matching and retention in a labor market with both
firm-worker complementarity, and asymmetric employer learning leading to adverse selection.
The majority of asymmetric employer learning papers following the tradition of Greenwald
(1986) abstract from firm-worker complementarity. Accordingly, improved transparency of
ability simply transfers rents and increases inequality without raising ex-ante surplus. The
main contribution of my model, by adding firm-worker complementarity, is to give labor
economists a better framework for assessing the potential for transparency-enhancing insti-
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tutions to raise economic surplus.
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CHAPTER 2
Adverse Selection and Reallocation Patterns in Law
2.1 Introduction
In markets for skilled professionals, firms can often be ranked by the scale and complexity
of their work. For the top firms, who hire engineers to design skyscrapers or hire lawyers to
litigate complex bankruptcies, the mistakes of mediocre workers are prohibitively expensive.
Meanwhile, firms at the bottom perform easier tasks for which acquiring top talent is un-
necessary. Thus, there is an economic return to matching skilled professionals to work that
is commensurate with their talent. Some of this return materializes immediately when new
graduates are matched into firms based on their academic pedigree. However, as long as
academic pedigree is an imperfect signal of true talent, fully efficient assortative matching
between workers and firms will require reallocation. How efficient are the initial allocations
of workers to firms? And how much does reallocation improve on this?
To help answer these questions, this paper documents several interesting features of
assignment dynamics based on a historical dataset covering US lawyers form 1930-1963. I
developed the data by linking together annual editions of the Martindale-Hubbell professional
directories of lawyers. The data are a comprehensive panel of all US lawyers from 1931 to
1963. The stakes of efficient assignment are particularly high for lawyers because of their
large investments in human capital, and the wide heterogeneity in the type of work that law
firms perform. Moreover, law firms tends have salient rankings, where top firms perform
more sophisticated and lucrative work and tend to pay out-sized salaries in order to attract
the most talented workers. The reallocation of lawyers through this intense heirarchy is an
interesting phenomenon in its own right.
Using my data, I show that lawyers begin their career by assortatively matching into
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firms based on the quality of their schools. I classify separations after the exit of a firm as
exogenous, and separations after survival of a firm as endogenous, and I find that endoge-
nously separating lawyers are significantly adversely selected on latent measures of ability,
consistent with asymmetric employer learning, and move to smaller firms where their col-
leagues are of lower average ability. Meanwhile, displaced lawyers show almost no evidence
of selection, but nonetheless move to larger firms where their colleagues are of higher average
ability. These findings support the model of Chapter 1, where firm-worker complementar-
ity and asymmetric employer learning interact to generate assortative initial assignments,
adverse selection, and lopsided reallocation dynamics.
My results seem to contrast with a commonly found tendency for inter-firm mobility to
flow up the ‘job ladder’. In fact, the lens provided in Chapter 1suggests that separating
lawyers are adversely selected, and generate more economic surplus when matched with
lower-ranking firms because of firm-worker complementarities in production. Conversely,
retained workers are positively selected, so moving up in surplus requires moving up in firm
rank—but not until an exogenous shock to their firm frees them from the adverse selection
problem.
Having summarized the main results, I will end the introduction with a review of the
related literature. The rest of the paper will be divided as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
data, and Section 2.3 presents the empirical results. The final section concludes.
2.1.1 Related literature
Asymmetric employer learning. A large and more recent body of work has found
evidence of private or asymmetric employer learning, where employers learn relatively more
about their workers’ talents than rival firms.1 For example, Kahn (2013) estimates a model
where the relative speeds of incumbent versus outside firm learning are captured by the rela-
tive variances in individual pay changes, and finds that “in one period, outside firms reduce
the average expectation error over worker ability by roughly a third of the reduction made by
1Examples include Kahn (2013), Kahn and Lange (2014), Schonberg (2007), and Braga (2018).
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incumbent firms.” I present complementary evidence of asymmetric learning by showing that
future legal ability ratings—a latent proxy for unobserved talent—are negatively predictive
of current turnover, suggesting that employers selectively retain workers based on private
information about their talent.
Patterns in worker reallocation. This paper is related to the empirical literature
on the on-the-job reallocation of workers across ranked firms, which has mostly supported
a hypothesis known as the job ladder. Although the term “job ladder” was originally a
generic name for a hierarchical ranking of jobs, the term now describes two stylized patterns
that frequently recur in economic models of on the job search dating back to Burdett and
Mortensen (1998). In a standard job ladder model, the firms that are higher on the ladder
are innately more productive, are willing to pay higher wages to any given worker, and are
more desirable employers. In equilibrium, a worker tends to enter the bottom of the ladder
from unemployment, and gradually moves up by selectively accepting poaching offers that
arrive at random. Exogenous shocks occasionally displace the worker into unemployment
by destroying her current job, forcing her to start at the bottom of the ladder again when
seeking reemployment. See Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013) for one of the latest iterations.
There is fairly abundant empirical evidence for this view of the job ladder based on
comparing the transitions of poached workers to workers who are displaced into unemploy-
ment before reemploying. Some recent examples of empirical evidence for the job ladder are
Haltiwanger et al. (2018) using data from the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics
(LEHD) and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2017) using data from the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP).2
The results of this paper do not support the existence of a unanimous job ladder in
law. Instead, they support the idea, as in Lise and Robin (2017) and Eeckhout and Kircher
(2011), that firm-worker complementarity results in workers of different abilities having a
different job ladder or surplus-ranking of firms. If separating lawyers are adversely selected,
2The first paper ranks firms according to size, wages, or productivity, and studies net poaching outflows
and inflows by rank quintile to verify that poaching is more prominent for firms at the bottom of the ladder.
The second approach shows that job changers obtain relatively faster wage growth than job-stayers.
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and lower-ranking firms have a comparative advantage in producing with low-ability lawyers,
than movements down in firm-rank may constitute movements up the job ladder. Indeed,
Haltiwanger et al. (2018) find that the evidence of a unanimous job-ladder is relatively weak
among college-educated workers, which to some degree anticipates the results on lawyers in
this paper.
2.2 Data and Background
My main data consist of linked entries in the annual Martindale-Hubbell professional direc-
tories covering US lawyers for all years between 1931 and 1963. I also match these data to
deanonymized 1940 Census microdata, which I mainly use to infer permanent income from
housing expenditure. Martindale-Hubbell (hereafter MH) is an information services com-
pany whose predecessor firms, Martindale’s and Hubbell’s, were founded in the mid-1800s
and then merged in 1931. MH’s principal products are biographical information on lawyers
and legal digests.3 Data from the MH directories have been used in several previous studies
in economics and empirical legal studies.4 MH was without a doubt the primary method for
lawyers to advertise their services during the period of study.
I am aware of only one study that has attempted to transform the MH data into a
comprehensive panel of individual lawyers’ careers: Baker and Parkin (2006). Their paper
mainly describes the process of collecting and cleaning MH’s directories from 1998 to 2004,
and then uses the data to describe certain new developments in the organization of law firms.
Unfortunately, no additional developments appear to have come from this dataset.5
Each annual MH directory has a Biographical section, ordered by geographical markets
(city/town and state), containing one or two lines of basic detail about every lawyer who
3Prior to the merger, Martindale’s had the superior biographical information, and Hubbell’s the superior
digest.
4Some notable examples include Garicano and Hubbard (2005), Spurr (1990), and Galanter and Palay
(1993).
5MH seems to have become less cooperative over time in giving researchers access to their modern,
computerized data.
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responded to a questionnaire sent by MH’s offices. Every person registered with the state
or local bar association received a questionnaire. Professional directories like MH were the
only legal method by which lawyers could advertise their services and inclusion was free, so
the response rate to the questionnaires was very high.
The main purpose of the MH directory was to aid businesses searching for trustworthy
lawyers in outside their usual place of business. In the early days, the legal matter at
hand often involved a collection on outstanding trade credit. An excerpt from the 1902
Martindale’s directory reads:
The merchant would investigate with the most scrupulous care the standing of a
customer before selling him a small bill of goods, but would without hesitation
send a large claim for collection to a lawyer in some far-away [S]tate, of whose
responsibility and trustworthiness he knew absolutely nothing; often taking a
name from some one of the numerous so-called lists of “Reliable Lawyers,” pub-
lished for the purpose of advertising such lawyers, and not for the benefit of the
merchant, and circulated gratis, or at a mere nominal price. Whilst this may
have been excusable then, for want of other resources, it is gross carelessness
now. This is the want which this work fills. It is not published in the interest of
any collection agency or association, nor to advertise any special attorney or list
of attorneys, but treats them all impartially, rating them as they deserve to be
rated, regardless of their wishes, and is published in the interest of, and seeks its
patronage from those who have business to place in their hands, thus making the
very object of its existence diametrically opposite to those of any other so-called
directory.
The variables that I collect from the MH directories include each lawyer’s birth year,
location, name, law school, the name of their law firm (if they work for one), an indicator
of whether they’re an associate, a legal ability rating, and an estimate of their net worth. I
scraped every lawyer’s entry in the MH biographical sections and then constructed a thirty-
three year panel by merging individual lawyers’ entries over time on the basis of their name,
college, law school, and birth year. After implementing several techniques to correct for
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digitization errors, I was able to match about 93% of lawyers from one year to the next. To
assess how much of the 7% attrition may have been caused by remaining errors, I took a
random sample of 200 lawyers, aged 40-50, and manually searched for them in the directo-
ries. About 15% or 30 of the 200 cases were confirmed to be erroneous attrition caused by
digitization errors that could not have been corrected by an automated procedure.6 Thus,
of the 7% attrition rate, at least 2 percentage points are caused by digitization errors.
For lawyers in law firms, a bracketed abbreviated firm name would appear beside their
entry, possibly with a symbol indicating their position as an associate. The directory also
contained a Firm card section in which firms could pay a nominal sum to advertise more
details, such as who their notable clients were or the fraternal orders to which their partners
belonged. I do not use this information, except to rectify a small number of firm classifications
that were missing from the biographical data due to digitization errors.
The quality ratings are one of the more important and unique features of the data. MH
would solicit letters from colleagues, local business leaders, and clients of each eligible lawyer
and would assign to each letter a cardinal point-value. Lawyers with enough points would
receive a rating ranging from c, b, or a. In medium to large cities, only a ratings were
available for only those lawyers with ten or more years of experience. The a ratings will be
the main source of ratings data in the analysis. More details on these ratings and some of
the other information is reflected in MH’s confidential key in Figure 3.1.
1940 de-anonymized Census microdata. I match the MH data to the 100% Complete
Count 1940 Census data from IPUMS. My main use of the Census data is to measure housing
expenditure as a proxy for permanent income. To perform the matching, I extracted all the
individuals from the Census whose listed occupation indicated a high likelihood of being a
lawyer, and then used fuzzy matching on name, location, and age to match them to the
MH data. If the individuals I failed to match are “unmatched at random,” then dropping
6I used the panel structure of the data to try to painstakingly correct for as many of these errors as
possible, and I was frequently able to correct digitization errors in year t when similar information was
available in years t − 1 and t + 1. Unfortunately, certain individuals’ names are systematically more prone
to digitization error, which means that the chances of errors in two consecutive years are larger than what
one might ordinarily expect.
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them from the parts of the analysis that use the Census data will not bias the results. But
incorrectly matching individuals across the two datasets will bias the results, even if they
are mismatched completely randomly. Because of this, I opted to leave ambiguous cases
unmatched.
I successfully matched about half of the individuals in the MH data. However, this
percentage is significantly higher (about 75%) for individuals spending the majority of their
careers in law firms, which is the main sample of interest. One large obstacle in matching
every MH lawyer to someone in the Census was that many lawyers spelled their names
differently and reported slightly different birth years in the two datasets, and the resulting
variations were often not sufficiently unique to make an unambiguous match. Another factor
that could have prevented matching every MH lawyer to the Census is that some of the
lawyers who responded to MH’s questionnaire may have provided a different occupation to
the Census enumerators. This could explain why lawyers working for law firms, who are
likely to identify more strongly with being a lawyer, had such a higher match rate. The
main application of the Census data is to identify a mapping between law school quality
and permanent income, so the important question regarding selection into the sample is it
obfuscates this relationship. One way to probe for this issue would be to check if lawyers
from different schools were differentially selected, for which I found no evidence.
My measure of housing expenditure contains recorded monthly rental payments for
renters, and imputed monthly user-costs of housing for home-owners. The user-cost imputa-
tion follows the strategy of Albouy and Zabek (2016), who used the same Census dataset.7
Background on sample setting. The sample period is one of relatively modest and
stable growth in the legal services industry, where most lawyers worked in law firms with
relatively simple transactional arrangements, leading some to dub it (Galanter and Palay,
1993) the Golden Age of Law.8 Unlike in modern law firms, which typically feature four
positions—associates, non-equity partners, equity partners, and permanent counsel—most
7Specifically, I multiply home values by 0.0789 to get an annual imputed rent, and then divide by 12.
8This name is intended to contrast with the subsequent period of explosive growth of large law firms,
beginning in the 1970s, which coincided with a greater prevalence of associates.
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group practice lawyers in the sample period were identified simply as “members,” or “part-
ners.”9 Compensation agreements involved fixed profit-shares. Because there is not any
public data on these agreements, no one knows exactly how unequal or complex they tended
to be. Most biographies of law firms indicate that profit-shares were scaled with seniority
or experience, and that occasionally one or two of the most senior partners would collect
twice as much as everyone else (see Swaine (1948) and Bronson (1980)). In addition to these
shares, partners were sometimes promised a minimum guaranteed base salary, as was the
case when Cravath attempted to hire the famous John W. Davis (Harbaugh, 1973).
Summary statistics on the main variables used in the analysis are included in Table 3.1.
The sample consists of lawyer-year observations where the lawyer belongs to a law firm with
four or more lawyers, is below the age of 55, and entered the market after the year 1931.10
The meanings of the transitions variables are described in a few paragraphs below.
Measuring mobility. Because my main interest is ranking firms and studying mobility
through the ranks, I keep track of who is working with whom at each point in time, and de-
velop a taxonomy of transitions: leaving the data (attrition), exit to sole practice, separation
after firm exit, separation after firm survival, and retention. I classify lawyers into annual
groups of colleagues grouping together the lawyers who are listed in the same geographical
location and have the same abbreviated firm-name.11 I refer to this grouping as a colleague
set. Firm names are too inconsistent over time to be useful for dynamic measurements. For
example, in the famous biography of one of the oldest and most prestigious law firms, known
colloquially as Cravath, it is documented that the firm held six unique names in the period
between 1906 and 1944 (Swaine, 1948). Therefore for the purpose of classifying interfirm
mobility, I measure the similarity between colleague sets in adjacent years. Suppose that
9About four percent of lawyer-year observations in the Martindale-Hubbell data are associates.
10Lawyers who work alone, even if they share space and other resources with other lawyers, are sole
practitioners. Using the “Class of worker” variable in the 1940 Census data, I calculated that about two-
thirds of lawyers not listed in firms are truly working alone. The rest are working for the government or
firms outside of law.
11Whereas most large modern law firms operate in multiple cities, this practice was uncommon during
the sample period. In the small number of cases where firms and/or lawyers are listed in more than one
location, I delete the duplicate listing in the smaller location and keep the listing in the larger location.
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lawyer i belongs to colleague set ci,t in year t and the ci,t+1 in year t + 1.
12 Let Ct denote
the set of all time t lawyers. The first measure is
d1i,t =
||ci,t ∩ ci,t+1||
||ci,t ∩ Ct+1|| =
Consecutive colleagues
Time t colleagues who stayed in the market
.
The second measure is
d2i,t =
||ci,t ∩ ci,t+1||
||Ct ∩ ci,t+1|| =
Consecutive colleagues
Time t+ 1 colleagues previously in market
.
In both cases, I count only the individuals who are in the sample during both time
periods—otherwise, influxes of new lawyers or retirements of several older partners at once
could have large effects on the results. When both of these measures are close to 1, it seems
uncontroversial to assume that the firms are the same, but not when only one measure is
close to one.13 When the first measure is low, it indicates that the lawyer’s old team does not
constitute a large fraction of her new team, and it is thus likely that her team was absorbed
by a larger firm. When the second measure is low, it suggests that the lawyer’s old team
split up.14
I define several nests of mutually exclusive indicators of time t worker mobility. A lawyer
can continue working in group practice, exit to sole practice, or exit the dataset entirely. A
lawyer exits to group practice if she is not observed in a law firm for the next two years, but
remains in the sample. If there is only one intervening year of not being observed in a law
firm, then she is counted as still working in group practice, and the time t + 2 observation
is used for additional classification. Given that a worker remains in group practice, she is
either retained or changes jobs. A lawyer changes jobs if either distance measure is weakly
12If the lawyer has no colleagues in either year, the point is moot.
13Given that law firms’ main product is their talent, it would be unlikely for a law firm to re-brand while
maintaining an almost identical set of employees.
14In the data, a typical break-up involves a splintering off into different firms, with some colleagues
possibly exiting the market. It is relatively uncommon for entire groups of colleagues to be absorbed by a
larger firm. However, in historical biographies of some of the larger firms, there are occasional mentions of
absorption of smaller firms in order to expand into new practice areas.
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below 50%.15
Separations are distinguished by whether they coincided with the exit of the lawyer’s
firm, with exits being more likely to reflect an exogenous shock to the firm’s business. Using
these measures, I will now rank firms and study the dynamics of firm rank under the different
types of mobility.
2.3 Empirical Evidence
I will now use the data to establish several facts about how lawyers match with firms and
reallocate over time, with the intention of testing the model of Chapter 1. I will show
that lawyers assortatively match into firms based on the quality of their law school, that
separating lawyers move to lower-ranking firms if their incumbent firm survives, and higher-
ranking firms if their incumbent firm exits. Finally, I will show that the first type of workers
are significantly adversely selected, while the second type are not selected. To establish each
fact, I will rely heavily on ranking schools and firms.
2.3.1 Scoring schools and ranking firms
I create a detailed measure of law school quality, LSQ. Then, using the principal in the
model of Chapter 1that higher-type firms endogenously recruit workers with better signals
of ability, I will rank firms on the basis of their expected new hires’ LSQ. Thus, endogenous
sorting patterns reveal primitive differences between firms. Because the firms in my data are
small, I will predict new hires’ LSQ based on firm characteristics rather than directly based
on the firm’s identity.
By measuring law school quality, my intention is to capture an important component of a
lawyer’s initial perceived competence. Competence could mean analytical skills, willingness
to work long hours, attention to detail, or even factors that reflect taste-based discrimina-
15The majority of cases are very clear-cut. A stricter or more liberal threshold would not change any of
the results. However, the 0.5 threshold is preferred because it is the smallest threshold that mathematically
precludes two time t colleagues who are not time t+ 1 colleagues from ever being counted as retained.
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tion.16 Moreover, I am only concerned with the signaling content of law school pedigree,
inclusive but not exclusive to causal effects. Things that I do not control for, but could,
include the individual’s entire career history and legal ability ratings. Things that I can-
not control for include an individual’s performance in law school and public case outcomes.
These things are no doubt important—in fact, a somewhat obscure Wisconsin Survey of
lawyers conducted in 1932 matched the tax returns to the within-cohort academic ranks of
600 graduates of the University of Wisconsin Law School (graduating in years 1914-1932).
The study found that higher academic rank was highly predictive of eventual income.17
2.3.2 Measuring Law School Quality
I construct my own continuous measure of school quality, LSQ, based on a comparison of
how each school’s alumni fared in two outcomes during the sample period: estimated net
worth scores from MH, and legal ability ratings from MH. I statistically decompose each
outcome into a set of law school fixed effects after controlling for location, experience, and
age. I compute each school’s LSQ as the simple average of these two fixed effects, after
normalizing each of them into a Z-score.18 To corroborate the LSQ measure, I will compare
it to a set of ordinal law school rankings by Arewa et al. (2014). This begs the question as
to why I did not simply use the ordinal rankings directly. The problems are two-fold. First,
if LSQ only had ordinal meaning, then I would be extremely limited in the types of analyses
I could perform. Second, Arewa et al. (2014) is the most relevant ranking I have found, but
even their ranking applies too much weight to recent years to be completely appropriate for
my setting. It tends to overstate the quality of newer law schools, especially in the West
Coast, that were still up-and-coming during my sample period.
I do not have law school data for lawyers who exited the sample prior to 1939—about
16Taste-based discrimination was extremely important in 1950s corporate law firms. Corporate clients
tended to be White Anglo-Saxon men listed on social registers, who preferred to work alongside lawyers
from a similar background, and law firms took this into account when making hires (Swaine, 1948).
17See Garrison (1938), pages 55-56.
18I experimented with using factor analysis to choose suitable weights for the effects and found them to
be very close to a simple average.
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17% of lawyers in the sample. For everyone else, an omitted law school implies that they
did not attend. I treat failure to attend law school and missing law school as two separate
school categories with unique LSQ measures. Most of the analysis will not use individuals
with potentially missing law schools. Readers who are not interested in the details of the
LSQ estimates can skip the details below.
Details on LSQ estimates. The first step of the procedure scores law schools based on
two measures of the success of their alumni. I use two cardinal outcomes. The first measure
is the share of alumni obtaining the (highest possible) a MH rating. The second measure is
the average alum’s MH net worth estimate.19
For both a ratings and rent, I need to adjust for differences in location and age. More
populated areas are more competitive for ratings, have higher priced real estate, and could
disproportionately attract certain law school alumni. Older individuals have had a longer
time to build the credentials required for an a rating, may have different demand for housing
based on family structure, and may come disproportionately from older law schools. Thus,
the a ratings and rent-based measures are constructed as law school fixed effects in a statis-
tical decomposition of each outcome after controlling for a polynomial in age, market size,
and temporal trends. For net worth, I need to adjust for secular increases in incomes across
the sample period, and for the fact that older individuals have had more time to accumulate
wealth.
Thus, I statistically decompose each outcome into a law school fixed effect after controlling
for the aforementioned factors. To control for secular trends, I include a quadratic polynomial
in calendar year. To control for market size, I include a quadratic polynomial in the log
number of locally practicing lawyers. To control for age, I include a quadratic polynomial in
age.
The net worth measure is based on a set of eight nominal intervals (see Figure 3.1 for
an example and note that the intervals expand with inflation). I take the midpoint of the
19I also considered using expenditures on rent and housing using 1940 Census data. Average expenditure
was mostly proportional to average net worth. In cases when it was not, it appeared likely to be driven by
certain law schools disproportionately feeding into more or less expensive housing markets.
37
interval, deflate using the annual consumer price index, and apply a log transformation.
The sample used to construct each measure is every lawyer-year observation for lawyers
currently aged 45-55.20 The age restriction is designed to prevent newer schools with younger
alumni from being unduly penalized.
In addition to these two cardinal measures, I obtained ordinal tiers of law schools from
Arewa et al. (2014) in order to provide some external validation. The authors’ goal is to
establish a classification of school eliteness that captures persistent differences in schools
with a focus on the middle of the 20th century. They provide seven categories on page 68,
and I have added two more categories: one for schools that were too small to be listed in their
study, and one for lawyers who reported no school in the MH data.21 Figure 3.2 plots log net
worth against a ratings, color-coded by the 9 external tiers. The measures are both highly
consistent with the external rankings, and seem to complement each other quite well.22
Net worth ratings do a very good job of separating the lower half of schools. However,
net worths are top-coded and only available for lawyers in smaller cities and towns, so it
unsurprisingly does a poor job of separating the top half of schools from each other. Where
this measure fails, a ratings succeed. Only about a fifth of lawyers receive an a-rating, so the
share of a-ratings essentially captures how many stars a school produces. This is where top
schools like Harvard outperform good schools like the University of Minnesota. I produce a
final score for law school quality, LSQ, by dividing each measure by its standard deviation
taking a simple average.
20As opposed to having one observation per career, this sampling frame allows the speed at which lawyers
obtain a ratings, which varies considerably, to also influence a school’s score.
21By the 1930s, firms would seldom consider hiring lawyers who had not attended law school, despite the
fact that their own senior partners had often not gone to law school themselves, because it had not been
considered essential at the time that they began practicing.
22The main exception to this is New York University (NYU), a school with average scores on both
measures that Arewa et al. (2014) put in their top tier. They explicitly mention NYU as being a unique case
whose placement in the top tier is based more on its recent performance (see footnote 331 on page 68)
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2.3.3 Ranking firms.
With the LSQ measure in hand, the second step of the procedure forms an index of col-
leagues’ characteristics based on the LSQ of the new lawyers their firm is predicted to hire.
The LSQ of a lawyer’s colleagues is a very strong predictor of their own LSQ, having a raw
correlation of about 0.665, so an obvious starting place is to condition on this variable. My
goal is to estimate an equation of the following form.
θ˜i,f,t = E[LSQi|xi,f,t] = f(xi,f,t)
The index f(xi,f,t) is the basis for ranking firms. The simplest possible method would
be to assume that f(xi,f,t) is simply an affine function of colleagues’ mean LSQ. At the
other end of the spectrum, I could incorporate an arbitrary set of characteristics in xi,f,t and
estimate this function non-parametrically. I view this latter method as ideal, but for now I
simply choose a relatively small set of characteristics and estimate f(·) as a fully-interacted
second-order polynomial. The characteristics xi,f,t include the number of colleagues, their
average law school quality, their average tenure within the firm, their average experience,
the share that are a rated, and the population size of the location. Each lawyer’s raw index,
ri,t, is then transformed into a ranking among all other lawyers working at firms in the same
year:
ri,t =
1
Nf
Nt∑
j=1
1
(
L̂SQj,f,t < L̂SQi,f,t
)
(2.1)
To validate this method, I show that estimated firm ranks are powerful predictors of
career success. I consider three outcomes: log housing expenditures, log net worth, and
whether a lawyer ever obtains an a rating. All three outcomes are strongly predicted by firm
rank, conditional on a lawyer’s own LSQ, as shown in Table 3.2. This does not necessarily
imply that firms cause success. However, it is consistent with my preferred interpretation
that complementarity drives assortative matching, and thus reflects a component of lawyers’
abilities that are not reflected in LSQ.
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Because individuals in the same firm technically have different colleagues, they will often
be measured as having different ranks. Although mildly counterintuitive, this is a small price
to pay in order to avoid the mechanical biases that would arise from including an individual’s
own information in the measurement of their firm’s rank.
The estimated firm ranks appear to correlate meaningfully with measures of success other
than law school. Conditional on your own law school, working at a higher-ranking firm has
large positive effects on predicted home-values, net worth estimates, ability ratings, and
predicted wages (conditional on being a wage earner). My interpretation of these facts is not
necessarily that firm rank causes wealth, but rather that equilibrium assortative matching
between firm and worker types causes firm rank to reflect some of the residual ability not
explained by LSQ.
2.3.4 Empirical Facts on Matching and Reallocation
Fact 1: Assortative Matching by Quality of Law School. I will now show that
lawyers assortatively match into firms based on where they went to school. To do this, I will
regress a lawyer’s own law school quality measure on the size of her firm and the average
law school quality of her colleagues. To avoid a mechanical finding of sorting, average law
school quality will be a leave-out mean that omits the individual’s own LSQ. The results are
presented in Table 3.3, and reveal that larger firms with a stock of lawyers from better average
schools tend to recruit new lawyers who are from better schools. To facilitate interpretation,
note that a one-unit increase in LSQ is associated with a 20% increase in predicted housing
expenditure.
This type of sorting is difficult to rationalize without a theory where firms are compara-
tively advantaged in distinct levels of worker talent. Comparative advantage can arise either
because of truly innate differences between firms, or because of differences in the stocks of
employees those firms happen to have accumulated. In the standard job ladder literature,
better firms have an absolute advantage. The economic surplus of a worker’s placement is
increasing with its position in the ladder, irrespective of how talented she is. This implies
that the first-best assignment places every worker at the top of the ladder.
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Those who are familiar with the skilled professions will recognize that the top firms are
not likely to be a good fit for mediocre workers, making the absolute advantage assumption
implausible. Top firms find it unattractive to hire less talented workers because their projects
are more difficult and the costs associated with failure are larger. However, the absolute
advantage assumption seems plausible for less skilled segments of the labor market, such
as manufacturing, where firms differ in technical efficiency but not in the difficulty of their
projects. The incentive for firms to specialize in distinct levels of talent may be a unique
feature of the skilled professions.
As recognized by Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) (among others), even firms that have
absolute productivity advantages will only have comparative surplus advantages if hiring a
worker prevents the hiring of someone else. In this case, the opportunity cost of hiring a
worker is not just the value of her time—it also includes the foregone opportunity to hire
someone who would have been a better match. One of the more immediate reasons why a
high-type firm will be hesitant to hire a low-type worker is overhead costs. I have reviewed
historical data on the overhead expenses of professional law firms during this time period
and found that, indeed, overhead rises on a per-attorney basis with the stature of the firm.
Figure 3.3 contains a reprinted table of per-lawyer overhead expenses compared to per-
lawyer income across different net income groups for a sample of New York County lawyers
surveyed in 1933 and reported in the American Bar Association’s Economic Survey of the
Legal Profession. The reason that overhead tended to increase with income is that higher-
earning firms tended to recruit more capital and labor (typewriters, libraries, secretaries,
stenographers, etc.) to support each of their individual lawyers.
Fact 2: Changes in firm rank after separation. In Table 3.4, I have regressed
changes in firm rank on mutually exclusive indicators for separation following firm survival,
separation following firm exit, and retention (the omitted category). The first column shows
that lawyers who separate when their firm survives lose an average of 6 percentage points
in rank, while lawyers who separate after their firm exits gain an average of 3.7 percentage
points. However, separation rates can differ by firm rank, and a potential concern would
be that if high-ranking firms had higher separation rates (they do) then mean reversion
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could create mechanical downward mobility. Hence, the second column controls for the
rank of the original firm. The results show that a top-ranked lawyer is predicted to lose
7 percentage points more in rank than a bottom-ranked lawyer—so there is some mean
reversion. However, the coefficients on the separation indicators are virtually unchanged.
The third column controls for a host of other potentially important factors, like the quality
of the lawyer’s law school, her market size, current experience, age, and year fixed effects.
These additions increase explanatory power but have minimal effects on the effects of the
two types of separations.
The evidence suggests quite robustly that lawyers lose rank when they separate from
surviving firms and gain rank when they separate from exiting firms. These findings are
opposite to what we would expect from the standard job ladder literature’s predictions
about poached versus displaced workers.
Fact 3: Adverse selection. Why do separating lawyers move to lower-ranked firms if
their previous firm survives, and better-ranked firms if their previous firm exits? I will now
present evidence that the former types of separations involve adverse selection. On the other
hand, and as one might expect if firms exit because of exogenous shocks, the other set of
lawyers appear to be neither negatively nor positively selected.
To test for selection on unobserved ability, I will again use the a ratings published by
MH. Because lawyers do not qualify to receive an a rating until they have 10 or more years
of experience, future a rating attainment can be thought of as a latent measure of current
talent. I will assume that when a lawyer has between 1 and 6 years of experience, the market
at this point in time does not know whether she will receive an a rating in the future. Thus,
the information about future a ratings attainment contained in a separation outcome reflects
whether separations select on ability.
This type of latent-variable approach is a canonical method for testing whether firms
privately learn about their employees’ talents. Several papers starting with Gibbons and Katz
(1991) have found evidence that workers who separated under plant closings obtained better
future reemployment wages than workers who were laid off, although the adverse selection
interpretation has been challenged by Krashinsky (2002), who pointed out that plant closings
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disproportionately affect small firms, and thus the lower future earnings of laid off workers
might simply reflect disproportionate losses in size-wage premia rather than adverse selection.
Some of the more recent literature tests for asymmetric learning by studying the correlation
between earnings and hidden variables like, in the case of Schonberg (2007), scores on the
Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT).23 Unlike AFQT scores, a ratings have not been
determined at the time of the separations I consider in my test. Because a ratings are
direct measures of talent, they are also not susceptible to the wage determination critique
of Krashinsky (2002).
I will estimate the probabilities that a lawyer receives an a rating during her career as
a function of whether she separates following firm exit, separates following firm survival, or
is retained, as well as other relevant aspects of her job history. To avoid sample-selection
bias, I will take care to estimate these probabilities on a sample of lawyers who are known
to continue working for law firms in the data for at least 12 years, and were thus clearly
eligible for consideration for an a rating. To ensure that the revelation of each rating out-
come was not itself endogenous to the job transitions of interest, I will only examine these
individuals during their first six years in the market. Table 3.5 contains the results of three
linear probability estimates, which all suggest that poached lawyers are, ceteris paribus, 4-5
percentage points less likely to receive an a rating than retained lawyers. However, dis-
placement does not appear to carry any such negative association with the attainment of a
ratings. If anything, displacement appears to be mildly negative relative to retention. All
three specifications assign fixed-effects to each firm-rank quartile, which reveal that lawyers
at higher-ranked firms are much more likely to obtain a ratings, even after controlling for
the lawyer’s own law school quality. The results are also robust to controlling for market
size, year fixed effects, and age.
The fact that separating lawyers are adversely selected when their original firm survived,
but not when their original firm exits, strongly suggests that the former type of separation
reflects a choice by the incumbent firm to selectively retain high-ability workers. It is not
surprising that adversely selected lawyers are observed moving down in firm rank. However, it
23Two recent alternative tests of asymmetric learning are Kahn (2009) and Pinkston (2009).
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is quite counterintuitive to see that lawyers whose firms exit tend to move to higher-ranking
firms, despite no evidence that are positively selected. This is precisely the phenomenon
explained by Chapter 1, in which workers become increasingly revealed ex-post to be under-
placed at their incumbent firm, but cannot receive attractive offers to move up the ranks
because of the adverse selection problem. Once an exogenous shock arrives to terminate the
firm, they become free to move up the ranks.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper presented novel historical evidence on the matching and reallocation patterns in
law. The assortative matching of lawyers by law-school quality supports a theory of pro-
ductive complementarities between workers and firm technologies. The adverse selection of
separating workers whose previous firms survived supports a theory of asymmetric employer
learning about ability. I showed that lawyers reallocate down in firm rank when their pre-
vious firm survives, but up in firm rank when their previous firm exits the market, despite
no evidence that the latter group is selected. The strength of the model in Chapter 1is that
it requires no added forces to explain these last two facts. The interaction of firm-worker
complementarity with asymmetric learning results in lopsided mobility, where endogenous
separations lead down the firm heirarchy, while exogenous separations lead up.
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CHAPTER 3
Retention and Optimal Paysetting in the Federal
Government
3.1 Introduction
Whereas perfectly competitive labor markets admit a single going wage, employers in the
real world have discretion to choose different levels of pay in exchange for different hazards
of quitting. How can employers identify the optimal tradeoff when choosing a compensation
policy?
In this paper we build a framework for studying the long-term consequences of differ-
ent compensation policies on payroll, workforce composition, and retention. We use our
framework to study a massive federal wage reform affecting over a million US workers and
cumulatively costing over a hundred billion dollars: the Federal Employees Pay Compara-
bility Act, or FEPCA. We use the government’s personnel data combined with a natural
experiment inherent to FEPCA in order to estimate a dynamic retention model that allows
us to assess the impact of additional compensation, such as that provided by FEPCA, on
retention.
Some labor markets are dynamic enough that employers may be expected to acquire
optimal compensation policies via spontaneous trial and error. But many labor markets
are too bureaucratic (or concentrated) for trial and error alone to probe the relevant policy
space. Our structural framework is therefore particularly helpful for studying the decisions
of bureaucratic employers.
Our paper both exploits FEPCA as an identification strategy and provides the first esti-
mates of its effectiveness. After decades of operating on a national pay-schedule that ignored
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spatial wage differences, the federal government passed FEPCA in order to provide locality
pay to workers as a function of benchmark pay indices. These indices were computed at
fine-grain occupation and spatial levels. Our identification strategy exploits an idiosyncratic
feature of the locality pay formula where these fine-grain indices were spatially averaged in
order to produce a single extra pay rate for each locality.1
This spatial averaging created variation in locality pay based on the plausibly exogenous
composition of the local federal workforce. Certain technical occupations, like engineers,
were found to be underpaid all over the country. Hence, a worker’s locality pay was largely
determined by the fraction of the local federal workforce that belonged to one of these
occupations. Underpaid engineers in Indiannapolis received low locality pay, while well-paid
secretaries in Houston (home to NASA) received high locality pay.
Formally, our approach is to specify a dynamic discrete choice model of quitting the fed-
eral government which maps structural parameters capturing the substitutability of differ-
ent employment opportunities into both observed and counterfactual quitting probabilities.
We estimate the model using observed quitting rates in localities differentially affected by
FEPCA. The model can then be used to simulate the effects of alternative pay policies on
retention, payroll, and workforce composition.
Prior literature. Our quitting model is a variant of the Dynamic Retention Model (DRM)
originally pioneered by Gotz and McCall (1983) (henceforth, GM). GM formulates quitting as
the solution to a once-and-for-all optimal stopping problem based on an ongoing comparison
of stochastic net present income streams of outside work contained to the option value of
being retained for one additional period. GM used their model to predict how recently
contemplated reductions in retirement benefits would affect the reenlistment decisions of Air
Force officers. They find that a 5% unanticipated increase in compensation in 1976 and 1977
would have raised two-year retention rates from 83% to 86% for ROTC pilots and from 74%
to 79% for non-pilot officers. Daula and Moffitt (1995) (DM) uses a very similar framework
to study the reenlistment decisions of army infantrymen finishing their second and third
1Initially, there were 32 federal localities. Over time, the government added additional localities and
changed the boundaries of the existing ones. As of 2011, the last year of our data, there were 35.
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terms between 1974 and 1984, finding that a 10% increase in army pay would have increased
the first-term reenlistment rate from 33% to 40%, and the second-term reenlistment rate
from 63% to 71%.2 Knapp et al. (2016) use a DRM to study compensation and retirement
eligibility of Chicago public school teachers. Variants of the DRM model continue to be used
for workforce management in the public sector (see Asch et al. (2013) for a recent overview
of RAND’s DRM model).
At its inception, the DRM competed with several other modeling approaches for helping
government agencies predict how changes to their retirement policies might impact their abil-
ity to retain employees. The main alternative was the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL)
model (e.g., Warner and Goldberg (1984)). The ACOL setup was similar to the DRM setup
except workers were assumed to compute the value of being retained for one additional pe-
riod by assuming, in a time-inconsistent manner, that they would never choose to quit in the
future. Ignoring the option value of being able to quit in the future allowed the ACOL model
to be computed more rapidly at the expense of making less realistic forecasts—a tradeoff
that has become less desirable over time.
Given that corporations typically have formal compensation policies (see Baker et al.
(1994) for a famous example), it is somewhat surprising that the literature appears not
to feature a single application of DRMs in the private sector. This is not for a lack of
interest. A large number of published articles in the operations research literature study
optimal compensation policy in a Markov setting that closely matches our model, but these
articles do not actually estimate the parameters governing workers’ behavior. Hence, data
availability seems to be the likeliest explanation for why all of the DRM applications have
been in the public sector.3
The literature on pay and retention also features static reduced form models that predict
quitting as a function of contemporaneous measures of inside versus outside pay.4 Static
2Reenlistment decisions occured every four years.
3See Rao (1990) for one of the earlier examples in operations research.
4See Carrell (2007) who finds that inflexible Air Force pay systems lead to higher quit rates in loca-
tions with higher wage differentials, and Borjas (1982) who concludes that federal employees could be paid
significantly less at minimal cost to retention.
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retention models such as the above two papers do no usually attempt to isolate the direct
effect of contemporaneous pay on retention from its correlation with future pay. Hence,
reduced form pay elasticities don’t identify a policy-relevant parameter when pay is serialy
correlated. DRMs have the advantage of fully-specifying how the timing and uncertainty of
current and future compensation change the propensity to quit.
The downside of most DRMs in the literature following GM and DM is that they tend not
to address potential endogeneity between pay and unobserved outside options. Our DRM
retains the seminal features of the GM and DM papers, but uses what we consider to be a
more plausible identification strategy that exploits arbitrary unevenness in the effects that
FEPCA had on federal workers’ pay.
Both GM and DM allow for the presence of observable characteristics that simultaneously
change the value of inside and outside work. Their identification hinges on a subset of
instrumental variables that that are, implicitly or explicitly, excluded from the value of
outside work. In GM’s application, pay and promotion probabilities were a legally mandated
function of experience and current pay grade, which are both used as instruments. In DM’s
application, the instruments include cohort-level changes to the retirement system and pay
schedule, and the individual’s time in military service. Both the idiosyncratic variation
used by GM, and the aggregate policy-induced variation of DM, are potentially endogenous.
Compared to these two papers, our paper clarifies the distinction between control variables
and instruments for pay. We allow for the meritocratic or basic component of internal pay
and an index of external pay to have arbitrary correlation with external wages. We assume
that, conditional on these two components, the remaining component of pay that is induced
by the locality pay policy is exogenous.
The second contribution of our framework is to model endogenous changes to workforce
composition under counterfactual policies.Whereas the past literature has examined coun-
terfactual retention rates of a static cohort of workers, we study the payroll, retention, and
composition of a workforce that evolves endogenously via the replacement of departing work-
ers with simulated new hires. This helps us account for a tendency of policies to change the
composition of the workforce on both observables and unobservables.
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This paper is the first to quantitatively estimate the effects that FEPCA has had on
the government workforce. In anticipation of FEPCA, Lewis and Durst (1995) use a one
percent sample of data on 1985-1989 federal employees to test whether areas with larger pay
differentials experienced higher turnover rates. They found no evidence confirming higher
quit rates in localities with higher wage differentials, albeit with limited statistical power.
In comparison, we find a large and statistically significant partial correlation between quit
rates and occupation-by-location outside-wage indices.
Many of the papers studying retention in the public sector have sought to better under-
stand the role of non-pecuniary factors. Borjas (1982) considers how the political influence
of different agencies affected the quit rates of their employees. Bolton et al. (2018) show
evidence that presidential elections result in excess departures of employees from agencies
with views opposed to the winner. Our results suggest large individual, time-invariant het-
erogeneity in workers’ evaluation of the non-pecuniary benefits of federal service compared
to their outside options.
Our estimates provide crucial insight into a heated policy debate over how to improve
federal civil service compensation policies. The Heritage Foundation recently published a
report claiming that federal workers are overpaid by 16% relative to similar private sector
workers, and proposed to cut this premium by shrinking retirement benefits and automatic
pay increases.(Greszler and Sherk, 2016) Others have cited the relatively low separation
rates of federal employees as evidence that they are paid too much. However, Utgoff (1983)
explains that neither parity in pay nor quit rates is the relevant policy objective.
Firms choose compensation levels that minimize compensation and turnover
costs, and this minimum depends, among other things, on the size of the firm
and the fixed costs of hiring and training. To be efficient, the government must
also select an optimal quit and compensation combination. Equal or comparable
compensation is not an efficient principle.(Utgoff, 1983, p.396)
Our paper helps identify policies that obtain a cost-efficient combination of quits and
compensation. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
over-arching Markov framework for modeling and assessing compensation policy, describes
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the problem of pay being endogenous to unobserved outside options, and lays out our con-
trol function approach to solving this problem. Section 3.3 describes the background and
data. Section 3.4 contains additional parametric modeling restrictions and describes how we
estimate the model. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Framework for Optimal Compensation
3.2.1 Managing a Workforce under Exogenous Staffing Demands
In our framework, the demand for staff is exogenous, and the planner’s objective is to meet
demand at minimum cost. The employer has to continually fill a set of exogenous jobs,
i = 1, ..., N , with employees. When an employee quits, the employer must immediately
pay a fixed cost ψ to find a replacement. The employer commits in advance to a dynamic
compensation policy, which influences the quitting decisions of the worker, who is forward-
looking and subject to random preference shocks. The behavioral response of quitting to
compensation policy is assumed (for now) to be known by the planner.
Markov replacement dynamics. Each employee-slot pair is described by an evolving
state vector, xi,t, reflecting both the characteristics of the employee, such as age or experience,
as well as the characteristics of the job itself, such as conditions of the local labor market.
The employer chooses and commits to a wage-setting policy d that determines compensation
as a function of xi,t, wi,t = d(xi,t). Employees choose whether or not to quit based on the
wage policy and the evolving state variables, pq(xi,t, d). When an employee quits, she is
immediately replaced by a new employee with new characteristics xi,t drawn at random and
potentially dependent on xi,t−1.
In some ways, the framework resembles Harold Zurcher’s optimal bus replacement prob-
lem in Rust (1987). However, rather than directly choosing replacements, the decision-maker
chooses a costly policy that induces the rate at which employees are replaced. Unlike Rust’s
framework, which assumes that existing policies are maximizing a known objective and in-
verts them to identify state-specific costs, we are interested in appraising existing policies
that are known ex-ante to be suboptimal. The replacement costs are an input to our frame-
50
work.
Costs of a slot. The employer discounts future costs at rate δ. Let pq(xi,t; d) denote the
quitting probability of a worker conditional on the state and the policy. The expected costs
at time 0 to the employer of maintaining a single slot i is, in recursive form,
ci,t = c(xi,t; d) = w(xi,t; d) + δ
[
pq(xi,t; d)ψc
0(d) + (1− δ) (1− pq(xi,t; d))E (c(xi,t+1)|xi,t)
]
,
where c0(d) =
∫
c(x; d)dF0(x) is the expectation of the net present cost of a slot with a new,
randomly drawn worker. The employer’s optimal policy minimizes average net-present costs
per slot, d?t = arg mind∈D
∑N
i=1 c(xi,t; d).
In practice, it is not trivial for an employer to discover the the causal relationship between
compensation policies and quitting rates, pq(xi,t, d). Conducting randomized experiments
that span the set of all possible compensation policies is not feasible. Our approach is to
impose additional theoretical structure (via a dynamic retention model) so that pq(xi,t; d)
can be identified without variation in d.
3.2.2 Dynamic Retention Model
In order to model pq(xi,t; d), we now introduce a dynamic retention model (DRM) that
models quitting decisions as an optimal stopping problem. Workers experience period payoffs
equaling the sum of earnings and earnings-equivalent non-pecuniary benefits, and seek to
maximize net present payoffs.5 A worker i in year t has observable characteristics zi,t,
such as age, experience, education, and compensation history, time-varying unobservable
characteristic ui,t, and a time-invariant characteristic vi. She is subject to a known policy d
that pays her a wage, wi,t, while employed internally:
wi,t = d(zi,t, ui,t).
5Similar to Keane and Wolpin (1997), this specification is consistent with a more primitive environment
in which workers’ have access to complete markets and have preferences that are separable between labor
allocation and consumption.
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After receiving her wage, the worker draws exogenous i.i.d. shocks to the value of staying
1i,t and leaving 
2
i,t. After observing the shocks, she decides to stay for an additional period,
or quit. If she quits, she receives terminal outside option
V o(zi,t, vi, ui,t) + 
2
i,t.
6
If she stays, she receives 1i,t, and then enters next period employed with a new zi,t+1, ui,t+1
according to Markov transition kernel P (z′, u′|z, u). Her quitting decision is therefore an
optimal stopping problem satisfying the Bellman equation
V (zi,t, vi, ui,t, 
1
i,t, 
2
i,t) = d(zi,t, ui,t)+
δE1,2 max
{
V o(zi,t, vi, ui,t, 
1, 2),E
[
V (zi,t+1, vi, viui,t+1, 
1, 2)|zi,t, ui,t
]}
.
(3.1)
One of the state variables in zi,t is the worker’s labor market experience. We assume
that there is some terminal experience level at which the worker is guaranteed to quit. This
allows us to solve the Bellman equation by applying backward induction from the terminal
experience level.
Shocks. Each worker’s vi represents a time-invariant individual affinity for outside work,
relative to inside work, and is drawn i.i.d. from a known and fixed distribution at the
time the worker enters the workforce. The i.i.d. shocks 1i,t and 
2
i,t are assumed to each
follow Gumbel distributions with equal variances. Under this assumption, their difference
i,t follows a mean-0 logistic distribution with unknown standard deviation σ. The standard
deviation of the Gumbel shocks is the model’s numeraire.
Value function and quit probabilities. The Gumbel assumption gives us a tractable
analytical formula for the ex-ante value function, as in Rust (1987).7 For convenience, we
divide out the standard deviation of the shocks and work with β = 1
σ
. Let V¯ (z, v, u) ≡
6We put more structure on the outside option in Section 3.4.
7Daula and Moffitt (1995) similarly include i.i.d. additive shocks, but assume that they are normally
distributed, and thus must approximate the integral over the shocks’ distribution.
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EV (z, v, u, ).
V¯ (z, v, u) = βd(z, u) + γ + δ log
(
eE[V¯ (z
′,v,u′)|z,u] + eV
o(z,v,u)
)
, (3.2)
where γ is Euler’s constant. Quit probabilities take a convenient log-odds ratio form:
ln
pq(z, v, u; d)
1− pq(z, v, u; d) = δ
(
V o(z, u)− E [V¯ (z′, u′)|z, u]) . (3.3)
This implies that a one-unit, ceteris paribus increase in the net present value associated
with staying next period, EV¯ ′, will reduce the log-odds of quitting by β units. The following
lemma helps us relate to past papers that often estimate the elasticity of quitting with respect
to pay.
Lemma 7 (Compensation elasticity with Gumbel shocks). Define the total compensation
elasticity η as the elasticity of the quitting probability pq with respect to the future ex-ante
value function, EV¯ ′.
η = β(1− pq)EV¯ ′. (3.4)
Proof. ∂ ln p
q
∂ lnEV¯ ′ = β
d ln pq
d ln p
q
1−pq
EV¯ ′ = β dp
q
d p
q
1−pq
EV¯ ′
1−pq = β(1− pq)EV¯ ′.
The control function assumptions. So far, we have imposed no restrictions on the
process governing ui,t or how it enters V (·) and V o(·), so the exogenous i.i.d. shocks intro-
duced above are thus far redundant. We will now make a set of control function assumptions
pertaining to ui,t and explain how it identifies the key causal parameter, β.
Assumption 4 (Separability). Under the existing compensation policy d, wages wi,t given
zi,t are invertible in ui,t.
Under this assumption, ui,t can effectively be observed.
Assumption 5 (Exclusion restriction). There exists a subset z1i,t of variables in zi,t that do
not influence the outside option, V o. I.e., ∂V
o
∂zi,t
= 0 with probability one.
Assumption 6 (Relevance). z1i,t influences . I.e.,
∂w
∂z1i,t
6= 0 with strictly positive probability.
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Proposition 6. Suppose vi = 0∀i. Then β is identified.
The proof comes directly from the pay elasticity formula in Equation 3.4. Conditioning
on ui,t and the non-excluded variables, the instrument(s) can be varied to study the effects of
raising total net present future compensation on quitting probabilities, and hence identify β.
Of course, we are interested in the case where vi 6= 0, and we are interested in identifying more
than simply β, and to do this we will make stronger parameteric restrictions in Section 3.4.
Nonetheless, these assumptions capture the core of our identification strategy.
Finding a credible instrument satisfying Assumption 5 and Assumption 6 is usually dif-
ficult. For example, Gotz and McCall (1983) assume that workers’ pay grades affect their
inside wages but not their outside options (conditional on other controls). But if some
workers are in higher pay-grades than otherwise-similar peers, this might reflect unobserved
differences in effort or skill. On the one hand, if a worker knows that she has relatively
poor outside options, then she would naturally want to invest more in her career within the
organization, which would suggest that V o could be decreasing in pay-grade. On the other
hand, if a worker is highly paid because of unobservably high skills, then she probably also
has access to unobservably high outside options, suggesting that V o should be increasing in
pay grade.
Daula and Moffitt (1995) use aggregate changes to the national pay schedule and retire-
ment benefits as their sources of exogenous variation. A possible drawback of using aggregate
changes is that they could very well capture endogenous responses to unobserved aggregate
shocks. An advantage of the FEPCA experiment is that much of the variation in locality
pay appears to be truly arbitrary.
3.3 Background and Data
3.3.1 The General Schedule Pay System and the CPDF
We are specifically interested in compensation policy and retention in the General Schedule
(GS) pay system, which manages Human Resources policies for over 1.5 million white-collar
federal workers worldwide. To study this workforce, we obtained access to the GS system’s
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administrative personnel dataset, known as the Central Personnel Data File (CPDF) from
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Our sample contains all federal civil servants
in the GS system from 1989 to 2011, excluding employees of the Department of Defense,
United States Postal Service, or sensitive agencies and/or positions designated by the federal
government. See Bolton et al. (2018) and Zhang and de Figueiredo (2018) for more details
on the OPM dataset.
Workers in the GS system are ranked into grades 1-15 and steps 1-10. Their base salary
or ‘basic pay’ is determined by an annual grade-by-step matrix. Higher grades reflect in-
creasing skill and/or responsibility, and grade increases are promotions. Steps are, with rare
exception, a deterministic function of time spent in a grade.8 The GS workforce is divided
into administrative geographic units known as localities, which are similar to metropoli-
tan statistical areas, and fine-grain occupational categories based on an OPM classification
system.
To perform our analysis, we had to combine two distinct modules of the CPDF: the status
data, and the dynamic data. The status data report an annual snapshot of the workforce at
the end of every fiscal year in September, and the dynamic data report individual personnel
actions arriving in real time. The status data track basic pay, locality pay (from FEPCA),
location, occupation, age, and experience. The dynamic data help identify quits.
Quits. For our analysis, we are interested in studying separations that are initiated by
employees and are therefore informative of preferences for inside versus outside work based
on the usual compensation policy. We therefore would like to abstract from involuntary
separations such as layoffs and firings (because they don’t reflect the worker’s preferences).
Fortunately, involuntary separations are very rare in the federal government. Actual firings
almost never occur because of costly appeals proceedings. Agency restructurings often lead
to ‘reductions in force’ which can sometimes result in separations, but more often result in in-
ternal transfers. The actual rate of involuntary separations from our sample is a mere 0.03%,
8Grade-increases are usually earned through competitive application for vacant jobs, but some workers are
hired on so-called ladder jobs where promotion occurs automatically after a year or two unless performance
is unsatisfactory.
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compared to a typical range of 12% to 24% in the BLS Job Openings and Labor Turnover
Survey (JOLTS) from the past decade. Our analysis drops anyone who was involuntarily
separated at some point during their career.
Sometimes, employees volunteer to retire early in exchange for buyouts (known as vol-
untary separation incentives) that are offered first-come-first-serve by downsizing agencies.
The choice to accept a buyout, conditional on its being made available, would be a very
interesting source of variation, but unfortunately we do not have a good method to identify
exactly to whom buyouts were available. We only observe the accepted offers. Therefore,
we drop individuals who at some point accepted a VSI.
We drop a small number of individuals who at some point in their tenure have contra-
dictory personnel actions that seem to be due to clerical errors. We also drop individuals
who exit the status data without any indication of a quit. Our belief is that some of these
individuals are transferring into the Department of Defense or United States Postal Service
(in which case we cease to observe them unless and until they return to the scope of our
data-set).
Age. To protect individual privacy, OPM injected error into the age variable in the status
data. For each person-year observation, they first added a random integer drawn uniformly
from {−2,−1, ..., 2} to the raw age field, and then they binned it into a five-year interval.
We observe the midpoint of the interval (17, 22, 27, ..., 62, 67). Because the errors are i.i.d.,
individuals can have mutually inconsistent age bins over time. We opt to use only the first
observed age bin for each individual and we explicitly account for the measurement error in
the estimation.
Years of Service. A worker’s years of service in the federal government is important for
keeping track of accumulated pension benefits and therefore plays an integral role in our
analysis. The CPDF contain data on the number of creditable years of federal service for
the purpose of computing retirement benefits and leave accrual. Creditable years of service
usually corresponds to the number of years the employee has been retained in the GS system.
But it can occasionally reflect time served outside the GS system, such as in the military
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or national guard. Parts of our analysis will exclude people with extra creditable years of
service.
3.3.2 FEPCA
The centerpiece of our identification strategy is exploiting FEPCA to get an instrument
satisfying our control function assumptions in Section 3.2. FEPCA was passed in 1991 after
stagnating federal wages became a recognized public policy issue.
The Volcker Commission. Paul A. Volcker chaired a National Commission on Public
Service in 1989, in which policymakers met to discuss challenges facing the public sector
workforce. The Commission concluded that wages in the GS pay system had failed to keep
up with the private sector, and that government mission objectives were being compromised
as a result. The Commission report writes,
Unfortunately, after a decade of budget cuts and pay freezes, salaries of most
federal employees are clearly lagging behind the private sector. According to
the most recent survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the gap, on
average, nationwide is 22 percent. Whether or not that figure accurately captures
the differential for particular jobs and areas, there is no doubt that the pay gap
has become a disincentive in both recruiting and retaining a high-performance
work force. Many young Americans feel they can no longer afford to take a
government job, while many civil servants can no longer ignore the call of private
pay. (Volcker, 1989, p.37-38)
The Commission did not simply recommend increasing GS wages across the board. It
advocated for a closely-tailored adjustment to wages that factored in both occupation and
location.
The pay rate for a government secretary working in Phoenix, for example, is
much closer to that of the private sector than is the pay of a physician at the
National Institutes of Health or an engineer at the Marshall Space Flight Center...
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These locality and occupational differences seriously undermine the fairness of the
current civil service pay process, especially when all federal employees receive the
same pay whether they work in low-cost areas such as Kansas City or Norfolk,
Virginia, or high-cost areas such as San Francisco or Boston. (Volcker, 1989,
p.38)
The government passed FEPCA in 1990 and mandated that the BLS would construct
annual measures of pay disparities based on location and occupation, which would then be
used in a formula to determine annual pay adjustments as a rate of basic pay. However, the
formula did not allow workers in the same locality to receive different adjusted pay rates.
Instead, each locality had a single annual locality pay rate based on the average pay disparity
of the local workforce.
FEPCA became effective for most localities in 1994, but had emergency provisions to
immediately increase wages in San Francisco and New York starting in 1991. Figure 3.5
(data taken from Monthly Labor Review, 2009) documents the slowdown in GS pay growth,
followed by the implementation of FEPCA.
FEPCA provided detailed instructions for choosing locality pay rates. A set of 30 lo-
calities were chosen corresponding to the largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas by federal
employment. All other areas were grouped into a single, expansive locality called the Rest
of US .9 First, the newly created Federal Salary Council (FSC) would estimate average wage
gaps in each locality. This is the average percentage point difference between an outside
measure from the BLS, and a worker’s current federal wage. Second, the FSC would calcu-
late an annual target rate in each locality. This was the percent increase in pay needed to
reduce the average wage gap to five percentage points. That is, in locality l,
TARGETl = (1 +WAGEGAPl) /1.05− 1
9Over time, areas are added to the list of localities if they have sufficiently high federal employment and
if there is evidence that market wages deviate significantly from the Rest of US. The coverage of individual
localities has also grown. Unfortunately, these changes appear to be to small to be used as a source of
exogenous variation in wages. For our analysis, we use the most up-to-date locality pay area definitions as
of 2017.
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The locality pay rates were mandated to gradually increase as a fraction of these targets.
Pay rates were supposed to start at 20% of target in 1994, and increase by 10 percent of
target each year until reaching 100% in 2002. The FSC was required to recommend these
rates to the President. But Presidents Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Trump have typically
used their authority to increase rates by smaller factors than recommended by the FSC.
Figure 3.4 illustrates our own calculation of the locality pay rates based on the language
of FEPCA and published wage disparities by the FSC, compared to actual loclaity pay rates,
in eight selected localities. Because of the budgetary demands created by FEPCA, Congress
began allocating less money to nationwide General Schedule pay increases. Figure 3.5 shows
the trajectory of GS pay increases and locality pay increases over time.
It is this aspect in which the implementation has most importantly deviated from the
original intentions of FEPCA. Since 1994, Presidents have allocated less than the man-
dated increase. As a result, pay disparities remain far above five percent in most localities.
Nonetheless, the relative allocation of locality pay among localities, and the growth rates
over time, have been in line with the original bill.
Figure 3.4 displays mandated versus actual levels of locality pay for four of the most and
least affected localities. Houston, Los Angeles, New York, San Jose/San Francisco are in
the first panel of Figure 3.4 while Columbus (Ohio), Kansas City, Pittsburgh, and the Rest
of US (abbreviated as HO, NY, SJ, and ZX, respectively) are shown in the second panel
(with a different scale). The mandated rates are calculated using published estimates of pay
disparities.10 The panels show that locality pay rates have grown steadily over the years,
but tend to be about a third as large as the policy’s prescription. The percentage shortfall
between mandated and actual rates is very similar across localities.
FEPCA did not legislate its own funding, so Congress had to account for locality pay
increases in the annual appropriations process. The most affected agencies were given ex-
tra funding, and when this was insufficient, they cut payroll costs by offering VSIs (the
aforementioned buyouts) to older employees.11
10See the Pay Agent Reports
11We know this from analyzing the data ourselves and from discussions with federal employees.
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Ultimately, FEPCA directly increased the pay of over one million employees at a cost on
the order of a hundred billion dollars (2016 CPI) between 1994 and 2011. As of 2017, the
annual cost is reported to be $25 billion (2018 Pay Agent Report).12 It is difficult to imagine
a wage reform of similar scale and scope.
3.3.3 BLS National Compensation Surveys
To help in our analysis, we obtained the National Compensation Survey (NCS) data that
used to help choose locality pay rates. The surveys were designed specifically for use in
FEPCA to measure wages for jobs in similar locations, occupations, and ranks as individual
federal workers. The NCS data were collected from 1997 to 2010.13 The BLS’s methodology
was to send surveyors to sets of randomly selected firms in geographical areas to collect
data on the wages, hours, occupational category, and description of work of different local
employees. Each surveyed worker was assigned the GS grade level commensurate with the
scope of their work and their level of responsibility. All individual workers within the selected
firms were interviewed. About half of the survey areas were large cities corresponding to
individual localities, and the other half were small cities and urban communities comprising
the Rest of US locality.
The purpose of using this data is to construct a variable capturing occupation-by-location
measures of outside pay. Our identification strategy does not assume that locality pay was
completley exogenous. Instead, it assumes that conditional on the outside pay measures
(that were spatially averaged to determine FEPCA), the level and growth rate of locality
pay is exogenous to workers’ outside options. Our identification strategy assumes that,
conditional on these fine-grain measures, residual variation in locality pay rates are driven
by differences in workforce composition that are exogenous to workers’ unobserved quitting
propensities.
12The costs are much higher if one considers non-GS employees for whom the government has volunteered
to match locality pay rates.
13The NCS data changed classification systems in 2006. The 1997-2006 data can be downloaded from
and the 2006-2010 data can be downloaded from .
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Constructing our outside wage index requires us to map the NCS survey data to individual
workers in the CPDF. We first aggregate the NCS survey data by Major Occupational
Group, an NCS job classification.14 We then use a crosswalk (created by OPM) to match
occupational codes in the CPDF to MOGs in the NCS.15 We then match each worker by
MOG, grade, and year to the nearest corresponding NCS observation located within 15
miles.16
This process matches about half of the CPDF worker-year observations to the NCS.
Observations are not matched if, in a given year, there weren’t any nearby NCS workers who
had the same grade and MOG. Most of the unmatched observations are workers in the Rest
of US locality, where cities and towns were too small to justify frequent sampling.
Extracting outside wage indices from the NCS. Surveyors were given explicit in-
structions about how to assign pay grades to jobs. While it seems likely that they grading
standards were applied to surveyed workers in a consistent manner, we want to avoid imput-
ing too much meaning into these imaginary grades. Also, the NCS samples were relatively
small and infrequent. Most MOG-by-locality cells were only sampled once every two or
three years. Hence, we also want to avoid imputing too much meaning behind year-to-year
variation in the measured wages. Hence, we use a statistical decomposition that extracts
a time- and grade-invariant component of each outside wages. Let j = 1, ..., J index each
unique MOG-by-location cell, let i index a worker, let t index time, and let g = 4, ..., 15
index a GS pay grade.
lnwoi,j,g,t = αj + ψg + κt + i,t, Ei,t = 0
where lnwoi,j,t is the log outside wage from the matched NCS data. To construct our
14In most cases, wages are annualized. In some cases, wages are reported at the hourly level, in which
case we compute the annual wage assuming 2,000 annual hours.
15Our mapping requires some intermediate details. It is available upon request.
16Specifically, we obtain the latitudes and longitudes of the worker’s office and of the survey
area’s center. We calculate the distance between the locations using the Haversine formula (see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haversine formula)
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outside wage index, we estimate the above equation via OLS, and compute the predicted log
outside wage l̂nwoj upon substituting t = 1994 and g = 10 into the estimated equation.
Sample selections. We use two samples of the CPDF data in this analysis. The full
sample is used for basic summary statistics and simulation exercises. Subsample 1 covers
workers who begin their service prior to the start of our dataset and is used to structurally
estimate our quitting model in Section 3.4.
For the full sample, we drop individuals that are ever observed with one of the following
conditions: leaving and then returning to the GS pay system while remaining in the CPDF,
being employed at a grade level below 4 (considered blue-collar), or working in a non-full-
time capacity. We drop individuals whose location has ever been omitted17, and we drop a
small number of individuals who had seemingly inconsistent information over time. From
these observations, about 13% are missing a year or more of intermediate data during their
years of service. Some of these individuals appear to have quit and then returned to service
(a path explicitly ruled out by our model). However, more than three-quarters have no
evidence of a quit preceding the gap of data. Hence, we suspect that the data for most of
these individuals is truly missing, perhaps because they switched into the Department of
Defense or Postal Service. All individuals with a gap in the data are dropped. This leaves
us with about one million unique workers and five-million worker-year observations. We also
drop a very small number of worker-year observations with age bins of 70-75 or 76-80.
Subsample 1 is used for estimating state-to-state transition rules, and is a subset of
the full sample with the following additional conditions. Because our model rules out the
possibility that workers endogenously switch locations (otherwise the relevant state-space
would dramatically expand). However, we drop the roughly ten percent of remaining workers
who violate this at some point in their careers.
Subsample 2 subsets further. It is used to estimate the preference parameters in the quit-
ting model via maximum likelihood, which requires observing each worker’s full career. Fur-
17Location information was redacted by OPM for individuals with occupations that were deemed “sensi-
tive,” including for example Secret Service agents, and agents of the Department of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms.
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thermore, to avoid making complicated assumptions about how workers anticipated FEPCA,
we only wish to use data from 1994 and after. Therefore, subsample 2 only uses workers
who entered the data-set with less than a year of creditable federal service, in the year 1994
and after. This restriction keeps about eighteen percent of the remaining sample, or 94,000
individual workers. To reduce the dimensionality of the state space, we then drop individuals
who started federal service with an age bin suggesting that they were older than 30 at the
time they started federal service, leaving us with about 54,000 workers.18
3.4 Estimating the Dynamic Retention Model
In this section we will introduce some modeling assumptions specific to our setting and then
present our estimates of internal labor supply using the CPDF data. The compensation
policy is treated as invariant during the sample period. The workforce is split into a grid of
job-cells j = 1, ..., J based on their locality’s estimated locality pay growth rate, and the out-
side wage index of their locality-occupation pair using the MOG occupational classification
described in Section 3.3.
3.4.1 The Inside Wage Process
The period wage wi,t consists of two components. The first component is basic pay, wbi,t,
which corresponds to the shock ui,t in the general framework in Section 3.2. Basic pay is
presumed to be correlated in an unknown way with outside options. The other component
is the locality pay rate, Fi,t. Total pay is given by
wi,t =
(
1 + Fj(i),t
)
wbi,t. (3.5)
18This implies that years of experience and age essentially move one-to-one with each other and allows
us to drop a state variable during the maximum likelihood estimation routine.
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Basic pay. Basic pay evolves according to an AR(1) process:
lnwbi,t+1 = µ+ ρ lnwbi,t + σbeb,i,t+1, (3.6)
where ei,t is i.i.d. standard normal.
Locality pay. The locality pay multipliers Fj,t are assumed to follow the process
ln (1 + Fj,t+1) = gj + ln (1 + Fj,t) + σF eF,j,t+1 (3.7)
where ej,t is i.i.d. and mean-zero, and σF is perceived by workers to equal 0.
19 For the 48
federal localities observed during the span of our data, the implied annual growth rates range
from 0.006 (Rest of US) to 0.017 (San Jose-San Francisco), with an unweighted average of
about 1%.
To estimate the growth factors gj, we used Subsample 1 of the data and regressed the
left-hand-side of Equation 3.7 on a constant and linear time trend with coefficients specific
to each locality. The fit of the model is excellent, with an R-squared above 0.989–hence,
our simplifying assumption that workers believe σe,j = 0 appears quite reasonable. The
estimated growth rates, along with 95% confidence intervals, are depicted in Figure 3.6.
Pension benefits. In addition to basic pay and locality pay, workers accumulate retirement
benefits during their federal service. Most studies of federal civil servant compensation
have concluded that the most important difference in fringe benefits between white collar
employees in the federal government versus those in the private sector pertains to retirement
benefits.20 Hence, we explicitly model retirement benefits in the federal government.
Workers can access their accumulated benefits upon retiring, which usually occurs at
age 65, regardless of whether they end their career in federal service. When a worker quits
(or retires from) federal service in the model, we calculate the net present value of pension
19This simplification is to avoid having to integrate over a set of possible future locality pay factors when
computing the expected future value function.
20See Falk (2012).
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benefits and add it to her total outside option payoff. To calculate net present pension
benefits, we use a formula provided by the General Schedule to compute annual pension
payouts as a function of the worker’s career history, which are paid every year between
retirement and death and which are adjusted for inflation. The formula is a multiple of
the average of the worker’s top three annual wages (inclusive of locality pay), is increasing
in federal government experience, and depends on whether the worker is subject to the old
CSRS retirement system or the new FERS system (but all workers in our estimation sample
our subject to the latter). Workers can claim the calculated pension benefit regardless of
their employment status upon retirement. We use the FERS formulas on OPMs website
and, for computation’s sake, replace the top-three wage average with the top wage to reduce
the number of relevant state variables in the dynamic optimization problem.
To account for the fact that pension benefits cease upon the worker’s death, we integrate
pension benefits over calibrated survival probabilities that decline linearly from 1 at age
65 to 0 at age 100.21 The annual payout is m(EXPi,t) × wi,t, which converts into time T
net-present value
Ri,t = R(EXPi,t, wi,t) =
∞∑
τ=T
pi(τ)×m(EXPi,t)× wi,t. (3.8)
There are several other differences between CSRS and FERS. As part of the CSRS system,
mandatory retirement contributions equaling 7-8% of gross pay were deducted from worker’s
paychecks. Although the FERS system pays more generous pension benefits, workers don’t
pay into the system. FERS workers also receive an automatic one percent of their gross pay
invested in a Thrift Savings Plan (similar to a 401K plan), as well as one-to-one matched
contributions on the first three percent contributed and one-to-two matching on the next
two percent. To capture these differences, we assume that a CSRS worker’s effective wage
is 92.5% of her gross pay while a FERS worker’s effective wage is 104% of her gross pay.
Also, workers neither pay into nor accumulate social security benefits while in the CSRS
21The formula is pi(AGE) = (100 − AGE)/(100 − 65), yielding average remaining years of 17.5. For
comparison, the 1994 US life tables estimated a life expectancy for the average 65 year-old of 17.4. See page
5 of https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/lifetables/life94 2.pdf.
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system, whereas they do participate in social security under the FERS system. We assume
that payments into and receipts out of social security are a wash as far as individual workers
are concerned, and thus can be omitted from the payoffs of both inside and outside sector
work. We don’t attempt to account explicitly for the tax system. As long as workers pay an
approximately constant fraction of their income into taxes over time and across states, then
tax deductions will be implicitly captured in our estimate of β.
3.4.2 The Outside Option Process
Earnings after quitting. Workers are completely unobserved once they leave the govern-
ment. Nevertheless, we put some theoretical structure into the outside option specification.
Upon quitting (or retiring) at the end of year t, a worker starts earning outside wages wi,t,τ
in periods τ = t+ 1, t+ 2, ... up to and including the year of her retirement at age 65. In the
year after retirement, she cashes in her federal retirement benefit R(EXPi,t, wi,t).
22 The net
present value of quitting is therefore
V oi,t+1 =
65−AGEi,t∑
τ=t
δτ−twoi,t,τ + δ65−AGEi,tR(EXPi,t, wi,t). (3.9)
The outside wage woi,t,τ . A worker’s outside wage is a latent variable that is partially
correlated with the worker’s current basic pay, wbi,t, a relative outside wage index, l̂nwoi,
and an individual random effect vi. In the first year after quitting, t = τ , the outside wage
is
lnwoi,t,τ = φ0 + φ
1 lnwbi,t + φ2 l̂nwoi + σrevi. (3.10)
After t = τ , the outside wage grows at a constant rate such that lnwoi,t,τ+1 = go l̂nwoi.
Hence, Equation 3.9 becomes
22Other potential retirement benefits are not explicitly unmodeled.
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V oi,t+1 =V
o(AGEi,t, EXPi,t, wbi,t, ̂lnwoi,t, Fi,t, vi) (3.11)
=
1− (δgo)65−AGEi,t
1− δgo
(
φ0 + φ2wbi,t + +φ1 l̂nwoi + σrevi
)
(3.12)
+ δ65−AGEi,tR(EXPi,t, wbi,t ∗ (1 + Fi,t)), (3.13)
where we remind readers that V oi,t+1 is relevant to the quitting decision made at time
t–hence the explicit dependence on time t variables. The most important feature of this
specification is that it allows basic pay to be correlated with both the outside option and the
inside option in an economically plausible way. Importantly, we also allow for time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity in outside wages, captured by vi. This is the usual practice of
DRMs such as Gotz and McCall (1983) and Daula and Moffitt (1995), and can have very
important implications for compensation policy.
Exogenous variation in locality pay. The main reason we include the outside wage
index l̂nwoi in Equation 3.9 rather than including it in the worker fixed effect vi is to ensure
the credibility of the assumption that the trajectory of locality pay is exogenous to vi. Since
locality pay was designed to reduce gaps between workers’ pay and their local labor markets,
it seems likely that the growth rates gF would be correlated with these indices. However,
conditional on the index, any remaining variation in locality pay trajectories is driven by
the plausibly exogenous variation of the composition of nearby federal workers. Among two
secretaries who are equally well-paid relative to their local markets, the one who happens
to work alongside more technical federal employees will tend to earn more locality pay.
To illustrate the quasi-random nature of locality pay, Figure 3.7 presents a scatterplot of
the estimated MOG-by-locality fixed effects, l̂nwoM,L, for the log outside wage measure,
l̂nwom,l. The plot illustrates that many groups of employees had very similar relative local
labor market indices, but very different locality pay trajectories.
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The Bellman Equation. Under the above modeling assumptions, Equation 3.2 becomes
V¯ (AGEi,t, EXPi,t, Fi,t, wbi,t, woi,t, vi, gj(i)) =
β × wbi,t (1 + Fi,t) + γ+
δ log
(
eEi,t[V¯ (AGEi,t+1,EXPi,t+1,Fi,t+1,wbi,t+1,woi,t+1)] + eV
o(AGEi,t,EXPi,t,wbi,t,woi,t,Fi,t,vi)
)
,
(3.14)
where V o(·) was provided in Equation 3.11.
3.4.3 Estimation of State-to-State Transitions
The stochastic transition rules for the state variables determining inside and outside payoffs
can be estimated without solving the worker’s optimal quitting problem. First, we estimate
the AR(1) process for basic pay in Equation 3.6 using OLS. The estimates are included in
Table 3.6. To check the normality assumption, the residuals from Equation 3.6 are normal-
ized by the estimated standard deviations σˆb and then plotted against a standard normal
distribution in Figure 3.6.23
Second, we fit annual data on locality pay multipliers to get an annual logarithmic growth
rate for each locality, gj, j = 1, ..., J , giving equal weight to each year.
3.4.4 Estimating Remaining Parameters
We calibrate the discount factor δ = 0.90.24 The remaining parameters to be estimated are
θ =
(
β, φ0, φ1, φ2, {gj}Jj=1, σre
)
. Despite our economically motivated specification for outside
23If stay/quit decisions are endogenous to future pay, then workers anticipating less favorable shocks vi
would select out of the sample and the estimated wage process will be biased. Although our model setup
rules this out by assuming that workers observe next period’s wage only after deciding to stay, it would still
be ideal to estimate a wage process that is robust to this form of sample selection. One solution would be the
Two-Step Heckman Correction procedure, which would require an instrumental variable for the retention
probability that is exogenous to the future pay. If we found that individuals with a lower estimated propensity
to stay in the government tended to draw higher future pay (conditional on current pay), than this would
be indicative of a clear problem. We estimated a sample selection model using locality pay growth rate as
instrument, and didn’t find any evidence of this problem.
24Most of the dynamic retention literature has used, or estimated, discount factors close to 0.9. However,
Warner and Pleeter (2001) estimated discount factors for retiring members of the military as low as 80%.
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options, we do not observe these outcomes directly. Instead, they are estimated indirectly via
revealed preference, i.e., quit rates, and are estimated via full-solution maximum likelihood
estimation of the quitting model.
The likelihood function. We can write down a straightforward likelihood function
implied by the quitting model, but it needs to be adapted to account for latent unobserved
variables. First, recall from Section 3.3 that instead of observing true age, we observe the
worker’s starting age after it has been injected with error and then binned. Using Bayes’
Theorem, we can recover a posterior distribution over the worker’s true starting age. Each
age bin has five possible integer ages, so let A denote the midpoint age (with A−2 and A+2
the lower and upper bounds) and let a denote the true starting age.
Pr(a|A) = Pr(a)Pr(A|a)∑A+2
a˜=A−2 Pr(a˜)Pr(A|a˜)
.
We make the simple assumption that the probability mass function for starting age,
Pr(a), declines linearly from age 22 down to 0 at age 65. I.e.,
f(AGE) =
c(65− AGE) if 22 ≤ AGE < 650 otherwise , (3.15)
where c is a constant of proportionality ensuring that integration to one. This assumption is
sufficient to determine Pr(a|A) above. To check the quality of the assumption, we compare
the implied distribution over the error-injected and binned age variable to that which is
observed empirically in Figure 3.8. The fit implied by our simple assumption appears to be
quite good.
Pr(A|a) can be recovered from
Pr(A|a) = Pr(a+ea ∈ [A−2, A+2]|a) = 1
5
||{a−2, . . . , a+2}∩{A−2, . . . , A+2}||. (3.16)
The assumed prior probability mass function for a, the implied distribution of A, and the
implied posterior distribution of a conditional on A are all graphed in Figure 3.9. Meanwhile,
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the vs are i.i.d. standard normal by assumption. Conditional on (a, v) and individual i’s
state variables at time t, the quitting probability pi,t(a, v) satisfies
pi,t [a, v] (θ) =
1
1+exp(oi,t[a,v](θ))
, (3.17)
oi,t [a, v] (θ) = V
o(AGEi,t + 1− a,EXPi,t + 1, wbi,t, wˆoi,t, Fi,t; θ, v) (3.18)
−Et
[
V
(
AGEi,t+1 − a,EXPi,t+1, wbi,t+1, wˆoi,t+1, Fi,t+1; θ, gj(i), v
)]
.(3.19)
Time is normalized to run from years t = 1 through t = T , and si,t captures whether
the individual is in the data at time t. Hence, if an individual quits in year t, it means that
si,t = 1 and si,t+1 = 0.
The individual’s entire likelihood function, conditional on (a, v), is
li [a, v] (θ) =
T∏
t
(
s
1−pi,t[a,v](θ)
i,t+1 (1− si,t+1)pi,t[a,v](θ)
)si,t
.
Since neither a nor v are observed, we must integrate them out and work with the
unconditional likelihood.
li(θ) =
∫ ∫
li [a, v] (θ)dFa,v(a, v) =
Ai+4∑
a=Ai−4
Pr(a|Ai)
∫
li [a, sv] (θ)φ(v),
where we are taking advantage of the fact that Pr(a|Ai) = 0 if |a−Ai| > 4. Our estimates
are chosen to maximize the sample log likelihood:
θˆ = arg max
θ
ll(θ) = arg max
∑
i
ln li(θ). (3.20)
3.4.5 Computational Implementation and Results
We use a simple quadrature approximation of the integral over the normally distributed
random effects by partitioning the unit interval into K segments of equal length, taking the
midpoints of each segment {v1, ..., vK}, and rewriting the integral in Equation 3.20 as
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li(θ) ≈
Ai+4∑
a=Ai−4
Pr(a|Ai) 1
K
K∑
k=1
li [a, vk] (θ).
Calculating the likelihood requires solving the value function via backward induction.
We explicitly solve for the value function along a set of discrete grid-points. We use linear
interpolation to approximate off-grid values when demanded by backward recursion.25 To
approximate the expectation of the value function taken with respect to the innovations to
basic pay, ui,t, we use the same quadrature approximation used for the individual random
effects. The estimated parameters are included in Table 3.7. To estimate the asymptotic
variance of the estimates, we computed the observed Fisher information associated with the
sample.26
The numeraire in the model is the standard deviation of the i.i.d. Gumbel preference
shocks.27 β reflects the value of net present earnings relative to the size of the shocks,
and it also has a clear pay elasticity interpretation that relates back to previous studies.
Using Equation 3.3, we can surmise that a one-time unanticipated increase in next period’s
pay, that neither affected the distributions of pay or outside options in other periods, would
reduce the log-odds of quitting by 0.006 for every $1,000. For a typical young worker earning
$45,000, with a quit rate of 6%, this translates into a pay elasticity of 25.4%.28
The estimated random-effects’ standard deviation of σˆre = 0.8891 indicates that time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity is very important relative to compensation. Consider a
newly hired 25-year-old worker earning $45,000 in basic pay having the typical outside-wage
index of 4.3 (for simplicity we shut down locality pay in this estimate). Her quit probability
is estimated to vary from 0.3% to 45.9% depending on whether her random effect is one
standard-deviation below or above the mean. This implies that workers are predicted to
25See the package repositiory at https://github.com/JuliaMath/Interpolations.jl.
26We calculated the Hessian of the sample log-likelihood function analytically using forward-mode auto-
matic differentiation. See the package repository at https://github.com/JuliaMath/ForwardDiff.jl.
27To be precise, the standard Gumbel distribution has a standard deviation equal to pi/
√
6 = 1.23.
28However, committing to a wage policy that pays older workers well may still be desirable so as to induce
retention of young workers. We’ll revisit this in the counterfactual simulations.
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rapidly self-select themselves over time, and has strong potential implications for optimal
compensation policy. Workforces comprised of employees with low tastes for outside work
are cheaper to maintain. Compensation policies with low initial wages and steep earnings
growth, or benefits that vest with tenure, will most likely to do a better job at achieving this
favorable distribution of employee tastes.29
We estimate φ1 to be negative, which implies that workers who receive higher base pay
tend to have unobservedly lower outside options. Thus, exogenous policy-induced increases
in compensation are associated with smaller increases in retention than endogenous increases.
We estimate φ2 to be positive, implying, unsurprisingly, that job-cells associated with larger
measured outside-wage premia tend to exhibit higher quit rates, ceteris paribus.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimated a dynamic retention model using exogenous variation in net-
present compensation induced by FEPCA. Despite the relatively low quit rate in the fed-
eral government, retention remains fairly elastic to pay, with a pay elasticity of about 25%
for a typical young worker. Workers who earn above average inside pay are estimated to
have unobservedly lower outside options. Our model also suggests the existence of large
time-invariant individual heterogeneity in the preference for government work, creating a
husbandry mechanism where different pay policies can alter not only the retention rate, but
also the type of workers who are retained.
Future work and extensions. We will use the dynamic retention model estimated in
this paper, combined with auxiliary assumptions about counterfactual government hiring,
to predict the impact of FEPCA and alternative compensation policies on the total costs of
managing the civil servant workforce.
One of the major simplifying assumptions of our approach is that recruitment is exoge-
29However, our framework does not allow us to make conclusions about unobserved heterogeneity in
worker quality. If workers with persistent unobservedly high preference for outside work are also more
productive, then this would work against these cost-based conclusions.
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nous to compensation policy. However, one might expect that more favorable compensation
policy will result in a different composition of workers applying for and being accepted into
federal jobs. Zhang and de Figueiredo (2018) recently find evidence that federal employees
hired during recessions tend to earn large and persistent wage premia compared to federal
workers hired in normal times, suggesting that the government succeeds in recruiting more
competent employees when it becomes more attractive relative to the private sector. Thus,
endogenizing the recruitment process to depend on compensation policy may give more
plausible results.
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3.6 Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3. The cost of retaining the marginal worker is paying her a wage that
makes her indifferent to either quitting or accepting her best offer from the outside firms.
As soon as the incumbent is observed making the equilibrium counteroffer, it is revealed
that z ≥ Z. Then the incumbent observes the shock ε and has the opportunity to adjust
its offer by ε. By quitting, Claim 1 says that the worker’s posterior ability becomes Z
with probability one. I will now show that, after a counteroffer is received, quitting to the
unattached market and receiving St(Z) is preferred to immediately taking an outside offer.
By taking the outside option, the worker gets continuation value V˜ equaling the contin-
uation value of a worker who didn’t receive a counter offer, plus a term reflecting the future
benefit of having posterior ability Z rather than (z1,t, Z). Let θ
′ denote the firm making the
outside offer.
V˜ = Vt(z1,t, Z) + δ (St+1(Z)− (λVt+1(θ′, z1,t, Z) + (1− λ)Vt+1(z1,t, Z))) .
Hence,
St(Z)− V˜ = s?(Z) + δ (λVt+1(θ′, z1,t, Z) + (1− λ)Vt+1(z1,t, Z))− Vt(z1,t, Z)
> Ez (s(θ′, z)|z1,t < z ≤ Z) + δ (λVt+1(θ′, z1,t, Z) + (1− λ)Vt+1(z1,t, Z))− Vt(z1,t, Z) = 0.
(3.21)
Thus, the incumbent will guarantee continuation value St(Z), the value of quitting, and
nothing more, in order to retain the worker, which it does in the event that z ≥ Z, which
occurs with probability pR = 1−Z
z2,t−z1,t .
Let Z = Zt(θt, z1,t, z2,t). From Lemma 5, a retained worker must receive continuation
value S(Z). If she is retained, then she gets the counteroffer wR. Then, with probability δ,
she survives into next period, and enters attached to θt with probability λ, and unattached
with probability (1−λ), in both cases having posterior (Z, z2,t). Taken together, this implies
St(Z) = w
R + δ (λυt+1(θt, Z, z2,t) + (1− λ)Vt+1(Z, z2,t)) .
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The result follows by isolating wR.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose T = 0. Then trivially the claims hold. Now, suppose the
claim holds for the model where T = K, as long as the worker’s posterior ability can be
described as z ∼ U(z1,t, z2,t). Then I will prove that these claims hold for the version of the
model where T = K + 1 and conclude by induction that they hold for all possible T .
In her first year of age t = 1, the worker’s posterior ability is uniform (z1,1, z2,1). Suppose
she is unattached. The value to a vacant firm of recruiting the worker is her expected surplus,
plus the future profits associated with becoming the incumbent. In this case, the worker’s
posterior remains unchanged, and so the continuation game is described by the K−1 period
model. Thus, the maximum value across vacant firms is strictly a function of her posterior
and Claim 2 holds.
Now consider the counteroffer decision and let us momentarily imagine that ε has a small
but positive variance. The incumbent’s counteroffer decision will signal something about the
worker’s ability. There must exist a minimum offer, wR, that the worker is willing to accept.
The incumbent will always pay this amount if it intends to retain the worker.
If the incumbent makes the counteroffer wR, it must anticipate a positive chance of
wanting to retain the worker. It then observes ε and decides whether or not to adjust the
offer. The payoff of retaining the worker is s(θ, z) + ε − wR, which is increasing in z. It
will never adjust the offer upwards, because paying wR is sufficient to retain the worker.
If it adjusts the offer downwards, then it is guaranteed to lose the worker. Hence, it will
only adjust the offer when s(θ, z) − wR ≤ −ε. Thus, if quits after counteroffers occur with
positive probability, it must be occurring because the offer was adjusted downwards.
I am interested in the limiting case where the variance of ε goes to 0. In this case, we
see that the offer can only be adjusted when s(θ, z)− wR ≤ 0. Writing a counteroffer costs
an infinitesimally small amount, so the incumbent will only write a counteroffer if doing so
generates positive expected payoffs. As ε converges in probability to 0, the expected payoff of
counteroffering wR converges to s(θ, z)−wR, which is increasing in z. Thus, the incumbent
uses a cutoff rule: write the initial counteroffer wR if and only if z ≥ Z. If the worker is then
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observed quitting, it must be that the offer was privately adjusted downward, and z = Z.
This concludes the proof of Claim 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof uses induction on T . First, the statement is trivially true
for all t > T (in which case each function equals zero). Now, suppose the statement is true
for all t ≥ K + 1. I will prove that it is true for t = K and thus complete the proof by
induction. First, notice that because s(θ, z) is HD-φ (Assumption 1), the full-information
match θ?(z) must be HD-1, and the full-information surplus s?(z) is HD-φ. The cutoff rule
is the unique value satisfying Equation 1.4. Suppose Z satisfies the equation under the state
(θt, z1,t, z2,t). Then rescale both sides by α
φ to get
αφs(θt, Z) + δ
(
λαφVt+1(Z, z2,t) + (1− λ)αφυt+1(θt+1, Z, z2,t)
)
= αφSt(Z). (3.22)
The time t + 1 functions and s(θ, z) are HD-φ by assumption, and I showed that St(·) is
HD-φ. Hence, we get
s(αθt, αZ) + δ (λVt+1(ααZ, αz2,t) + (1− λ)υt+1(αθt+1, ααZ, αz2,t)) = St(αZ), (3.23)
which implies that αZ is the cutoff under state (αθt, ααz1,t, αz2,t). The time-t cutoff rule is
HD-1. A worker’s time-t retention probability conditional on the public history is
Prretain(θ1, z1,t, z2,t) =
z2,t − Zt(θt, z1,t, z2,t
z2,t − z1,t ,
which is clearly HD-0. Rescale the arguments of Equation 1.2 by α and without loss of
generality replace the maximizer θv with αθv, and the integrand z with αz.
Vt (ααz1,t, αz2,t) = max
αθv
{Ez (s(αθv, αz)|ααz1,t ≤ αz ≤ αz2,t) + λΠt+1(αθv, αz1,t, αz2,t)} .
By Assumption 1, we know that the expectation in the first term is HD-φ. By assumption,
76
Πt+1 is HD-φ. Hence,
Vt (ααz1,t, αz2,t) = max
θv
αφ
{
Ez (s(θv, z)|z1,t ≤ z ≤ z2,t) + λαφΠt+1(θv, z1,t, z2,t)
}
= αφVt (z1,t, z2,t) ,
which proves that the unattached value function is HD-φ.
Almost identical arguments allow us to use the aforementioned homogeneity properties
to conclude that the unattached value function in Lemma 5 and the ex-post profit function
in Lemma 6 are both also HD-φ.
Proof of Proposition 5. There are many ways to justify this assumption. For example, in
the infinite horizon case, a worker’s long-run average wage converges almost surely to their
full-information surplus. Alternatively, the econometrician may observe some other outcome
that is correlated with ability, such as test scores. In both cases, a worker’s average percentile
in the distribituion conditional on their x reveals the median for each xk. On the other hand,
there may be a binary outcome, such as obtaining a certification, that reveals whether ability
is above a given percentile.
Assume without loss of generality that X is in descending order of ρk or pk. The following
lemma explains that ranking the xs according to these statistics must produce a first-order
stochastic dominance ranking.
Lemma 8. Let us say that k  j if z1(xk) ≥ z1(xj) and z2(xk) ≥ z2(xj), with  if at least
one is strict. Then pk ≥ pj or ρk ≥ ρj if and only if k  j (resp., > and ).
Proof. Consider the element K with the largest value of ρk (or pk, respectively). Then I will
first claim that z2(xK) > z2(xj), for all j 6= K. To see why, suppose not. Then let J denote
the set of event(s) with the maximum upper-bound z¯1 = 1, and let l denote the event with
the second-highest upper-bound, which may or may not equal z2(xK).
By the uniform assumption, we need Pr(z1(xK)<z≤z2(xK))
Pr(z¯2<z<z¯)
= z2(xK))−z1(xK)
z¯−z¯2 .
We know that Pr(z1(xK) < z ≤ z2(xK)) ≥ pK +
∑
j∈J pj
z2(xK)−z1(xK)
z¯−z1(xj) (”>” in the event
that l 6= L). We know that Pr(z¯2 < z < z¯) =
∑
j∈J pj
z¯2−z1(xK)
z¯−z1(xj) ,
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which implies Pr(z1(xK)<z≤z2(xK))
Pr(z¯2<z<z¯)
> z2(xK))−z1(xK)
z¯−z¯2 and thus contradicts the uniform as-
sumption.
Hence, the top-ranked event first-order stochastically dominates the other events, and we
can immediately infer that it has the highest upper-bound. If there are multiple ties for the
top event, then all such events must correspond to the exact same posterior.
The next corollary explains how we can solve for posterior ability for any event once we
have determined its upper-bound.
Corollary 3. z1(xk) =
qk−z2xkq
1−q and z1(xk) =
(ρk−1)z2(xk)+ρ
ρk
.
Proof. The first part follows from writing the qth quantile as
q =
qk − z1(xK)
z2(xK)− z1(xK)
and solving for z1(xK).
The second part follows from writing the success probability ρk =
z2(xk)−ρ
z2(xk)−z1(xk) and solving
for z1(xk),
Thus, one can immediately identify the posterior of the highest-ranked event using this
formula, since z2(xK) = 1. Next, consider the event with the second-highest upper-bound.
Based on the same logic as the earlier lemma, we can infer that the only way the unconditional
distribution of ability can be uniform is if the second-highest upper-bound lines up exactly
with either z2(xK) or z1(xK). Otherwise, there would be too much mass just below the
second-highest cutoff relative to the mass above the second-highest cutoff. We can then
verify which case we are in by determining whether we have fully accounted for the mass
that should fall between z1(xK) and z2(xK).
Corollary 4. Let j < K. If event j+1 has upper-bound z2(xK), then event j’s upper-bound
is either z2(xK), or z1((x)K).
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Event j’s upper-bound equals z2(xK) if and only if
pK +
K−1∑
k=j+1
pk
z2(xK)− z1(xk)
z2(xk)− z1(xHk )
,
where z1(x
H
k ) is the lower-bound for event k using Corollary 3, under the assumption that
it has upper-bound z2(xK).
This implies a recursive procedure that is guaranteed to identify every event-conditional
posterior. First, identify the posterior of event K. Then, iteratively go down the list of events
until hitting the first event J that cannot have the same upper-bound as K, according to
Corollary 4. Store the lower-bounds of all the previous events implied by Corollary 3. Thus,
we have identified the posteriors for all events greater than J and we have exhausted the
mass that can be attributed to the interval (z1(xK), z2(xK). Now, repeat the same procedure,
conditioning on z < z1(xK). Continue until all the upper-bounds and lower-bounds have
been identified.
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Figure 3.1: Martindale-Hubbell’s confidential key (1931 edition)
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Figure 3.2: Cardinal measures of law school quality
Northwestern College Of Law
Columbus U.
Montana State U.
St. Louis U.
Temple U.
Boston U.
ColumbiaYale
Stanford
UVA
Harvard
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
Ln
 n
et
 w
or
th
 F
E
-3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0
A ratings FE
Northwestern College Of Law
Columbus U.
Montana State U.
St. Louis U.
Temple U.
Boston U.
Columbia
Yale
Stanford
UVA
Harvard
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
Ln
 r
en
t 
FE
-3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0
A ratings FE
Estab. Elite
Rising Elite
Declnng Elite
Rgnl Elite
Rising Rgnl
Rgnl
Local
No Tier
None listed
Ordinal tiers
Arewa et al.
85
Figure 3.3: Overhead costs from Garrison (1938)
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Figure 3.4: Locality pay growth trajectories
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Figure 3.5: GS Pay Increases, 1965 – 2009
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Figure 3.6: Estimated annual locality pay growth rates
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Figure 3.7: Occupation-by-Locality Outside Wages versus Locality Pay: Selected Localities
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of Distributions over Error-Injected Binned Age Variable
.
Figure 3.9: Posterior distribution of age
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics by lawyer-year
Mean Std.dev. p.05 p.95
Age 39.13 7.41 29 52
Exper. 8.71 6.35 1 21
A Rated 0.36
Mkt. size 5,387.99 7,695.94 28 24,162
Firm size 12.33 13.71 4 42
Separation (firm survives) 0.06
Separation (firm exits) 0.03
Retained 0.83
Exit 0.08
Obs. 347,379
Sample: Lawyers currently in firms of size 4+, 1933-1960, aged 22-55, non-
attriting
Mkt. size reflects number of lawyers working in local town or city
ARated computed only on eligible lawyers (10+ years experience)
Table 3.2: Career success vs. firm rank
Ln 1940 rent Receives A-rating Ln net worth
Firm rank 0.347*** 0.224*** 0.319***
(0.0154) (0.00825) (0.0128)
LSQ 0.107*** 0.119*** 0.243***
(0.00648) (0.00350) (0.00510)
Mean dep. var. 3.884 .359 12.752
Mkt. size ctrls. YES YES YES
Age ctrls. YES YES YES
Time ctrls. N/A YES YES
N 29,383 45,164 90,417
R2 0.187 0.083 0.122
Mkt. size, age, and year controls each contain quadratic polynom.
Robust std. errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.3: Assortative Matching by Law School Quality
Dependant variable LSQ
Avg LSQ (leave-out) 0.662***
(0.006)
Log firm size 0.076***
(0.003)
Constant -1.291***
(.008)
N 49,736
R2 0.201
Sample of new lawyers entering firms of
size 4+
Robust std. errors (in parens)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.4: Change in firm rank
(1) (2) (3)
Separation (firm survives) -0.061*** -0.063*** -0.063***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Separation (firm exits) 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.035***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Rank -0.069*** -0.092***
(0.001) (0.001)
LSQ 0.018***
(0.000)
Ln Mkt Size 0.002***
(0.000)
Exper. 0.000
(0.000)
Age -0.000
(0.000)
Constant -0.001*** 0.041*** 0.040***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
Year FE NO NO YES
Obs. 314,984 314,984 313,683
R2 0.024 0.058 0.070
Lawyers currently in firms of size 4+, 1933-1960, aged 22-55, non-attriting
Sample includes lawyers who are retained as omitted category
Omitted year is 1933
Std. errors in parenthesis * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: Linear Probability Models of Future a rating
Obtains a rating
(1) (2) (3)
Separation (firm survives) -0.048*** -0.045*** -0.041***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Separation (firm exits) -0.010 -0.012 -0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Firm-rank 0-25 0.299*** 0.310*** 0.358***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.024)
Firm-rank 25-50 0.359*** 0.346*** 0.401***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.024)
Firm-rank 50-75 0.413*** 0.385*** 0.424***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.024)
Firm-rank 75-100 0.455*** 0.408*** 0.441***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.024)
LSQ 0.072*** 0.084***
(0.002) (0.002)
Added Ctrls NO NO YES
Obs. 119,007 119,007 119,007
R2 0.406 0.410 0.448
Sample includes lawyers who remain in firms for 12+ years
Added ctrls include log mkt-size, year FE, and age
Robust std. errors in parenthesis * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.6: Estimated AR(1) Process for lnwb (000’s)
Parameter Estimate (Std. Error)
ρ 0.973***
(7.19e-5)
µ 0.134***
(2.88e-04)
σ .047***
(3.81e-05)
Person obs 277,079
Person-year obs 2,014,200
***Significant at 99% level.
94
Table 3.7: Parameters Estimated via Maximum Likelihood
Parameter Estimate (Std. Error)
δ 0.90
(calib.)
σre 0.8891***
(.0469717)
β 0.00616831***
(0.000518685)
φ0 4.5561***
(0.262226)
φ1 −0.2393***
(0.0291)
φ2 0.146676***
(0.0549141)
Person obs 54,120
Person-year obs 473,220
***Significant at 99% level.
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